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As the war in Iraq and the campaign against international
terrorism drag on, the federal and state governments as well as
nongovernment institutions have grown increasingly bold in
their efforts to suppress political debate and dissent in the
United States. Law enforcement officers infiltrate and bully
peaceful dissident groups; police crack down brutally on mass
demonstrations; cities confine protestors at major political
events to ironically designated “free speech zones.” These
abuses buttress a contention, familiar from the work of several
prominent First Amendment theorists, that the Supreme Court
can provide political debate and dissent sufficient constitutional protection only by aiming First Amendment jurisprudence exclusively at protecting political speech—expression
whose primary value lies in its contribution to political discourse. On this view, broad, undifferentiated First Amendment
protection for speech compels balancing of expressive interests
against competing regulatory interests, and that balancing too
easily allows the government to justify suppression of political
debate. In contrast, narrowing the First Amendment’s scope to
encompass only political speech would allow the Court to
deepen constitutional protection for the category of expression
that sustains our democratic system.
The democracy-focused approach to expressive freedom,
however, has long struggled against the more influential idea
that the Free Speech Clause exists to guarantee individual
autonomy. On this view, all speech deserves the same degree of
constitutional protection because all speech entails the same
exercise of autonomous will. Accordingly, present First
Amendment doctrine favors breadth over depth of constitutional protection, giving all behavior that fits the descriptive
category “speech” the same presumption of protection against
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government regulation but balancing all expressive interests
against countervailing regulatory interests. The Court’s substantial embrace of autonomy as the basis for First Amendment
doctrine reflects the widespread appeal of autonomy-based conceptions of individual rights. Treating autonomy as the dominant value behind expressive freedom also provides a straightforward basis for protecting nonpolitical speech. Deepening
protection for political speech by narrowing the First Amendment’s scope would compromise protection of nonpolitical expression, including much art, sexually explicit speech, and
commercial advertising. However, despite the strengths of the
autonomy-focused approach to expressive freedom, its problem
is that it dilutes the First Amendment’s protection of political
speech by allowing even trivial government interests to trump
the interest in advancing political debate. In addition, by treating expressive freedom as a negative right, present First
Amendment doctrine inadequately explains why autonomy
matters in speech controversies and when autonomy values
should yield to government regulatory interests.
An ideal regime of expressive freedom would protect political debate with the depth of the democracy-focused First
Amendment paradigm while simultaneously casting a broad
enough net to safeguard speech that substantively advances
autonomy. The Supreme Court recently opened a path toward
such an ideal regime—a path that would expand constitutional
speech protection beyond the First Amendment into a distinct
source of constitutional rights. In 2003, the Court held in the
landmark case of Lawrence v. Texas that state bans on “sodomy” violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due
process guarantee.1 Lawrence has potential importance for
speech protection because of the decision’s two boldest elements: its emphatic identification of substantive due process
with the normative value of personal autonomy and its prohibition of state regulations that rest purely on moral disapproval
of behavior. By establishing that the Due Process Clause safeguards behavior integral to personal autonomy, the Court created an alternative repository for the idea that nonpolitical
speech essential to personal autonomy deserves constitutional
protection. By interposing the Due Process Clause against
moral regulations, the Court replicated in the substantive due
process setting the First Amendment’s antipathy toward offi1. 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
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cial attacks on socially undesirable ideas. Substantive due
process doctrine after Lawrence allows for appropriate balancing of expressive autonomy interests against government interests in preventing tangible harms.
This Article proposes that the Court fulfill the speechprotective potential of Lawrence by transplanting the Constitution’s protection for nonpolitical speech—speech that primarily
serves the interest in personal autonomy as distinct from the
interest in democratic debate—from the First Amendment to
the Due Process Clause. Invoking substantive due process to
protect nonpolitical speech would create an unprecedented opportunity to deepen the First Amendment’s protection of political speech while improving present First Amendment doctrine’s
protection of speech that primarily serves personal autonomy.
The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause would assume a
coherent focus based on the importance of political debate for a
healthy democratic system. At the same time, the Constitution
would protect nonpolitical expression based not on the arid
premise that such expression is formally “speech” but on the
crucial understanding that nonpolitical expression, to the extent it advances personal autonomy, benefits society as surely
as political expression does, although in a materially different
way.
The Article proceeds in three parts. The first part establishes both the wisdom and the difficulty of focusing First
Amendment doctrine on political speech. It reprises the theoretical case for a democracy-focused First Amendment and substantiates that case by describing the government’s campaign
against political dissent since the 2001 terrorist attacks. It then
discusses the cost for nonpolitical expression of a First Amendment limited to protecting political speech. Finally, it describes
and criticizes First Amendment theorists’ prior attempts to
minimize that cost. The Article’s second part examines Lawrence v. Texas in the context of the Court’s previous substantive
due process jurisprudence and explains how the Lawrence
Court’s innovations facilitate shifting constitutional protection
of nonpolitical speech from the First Amendment to the Due
Process Clause. The final part examines what difference a shift
to due process protection would make for constitutional doctrine in three important, controversial areas of substantially
nonpolitical speech: artistic and cultural expression, pornogra-

MAGARIAN_3FMT

2005]

12/22/2005 10:55:40 AM

DUE PROCESS AS PROTECTION FOR SPEECH 251

phy, and commercial advertising. Shielding nonpolitical expression behind the Due Process Clause rather than the First
Amendment would expand some aspects of nonpolitical speech
protection beyond their present scope while diminishing others,
and the shift would strengthen the theoretical bases for constitutionally shielding both political and nonpolitical speech.
I. THE PUBLIC RIGHTS THEORY OF
EXPRESSIVE FREEDOM AND THE PROBLEM OF
NONPOLITICAL SPEECH
A. WHY LIMIT THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO PROTECTING ONLY
POLITICAL SPEECH?
1. Private Rights Versus Public Rights in Free Speech Theory
The dominant influence on the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence over the past three decades has
been the private rights theory of expressive freedom.2 The private rights theory treats the First Amendment as a guarantor
of individual autonomy.3 That emphasis on autonomy generates a formalist vision of expressive freedom.4 A regulation or
action raises a First Amendment concern whenever the government abridges expressive opportunities that individuals or
entities secure in the private marketplace.5 Although present
free speech doctrine rests on a concern for personal autonomy,
the doctrine says little about what autonomy is or why autonomy matters; rather, it simply presumes that speaking reflects
an important exercise of autonomous will. The private rights
theory casts freedom of speech as a negative right rather than
identifying any affirmative purpose of expressive freedom. Accordingly, it extends First Amendment protection to all expression without regard to category. Because such broad protection
threatens to limit a wide range of government authority, the
private rights theory employs a balancing methodology, mani-

2. For a detailed portrayal of the private rights theory, see Gregory P.
Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public Rights” First Amendment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939, 1947–59 (2003) [hereinafter Magarian,
Public Rights].
3. For further discussion of the idea of autonomy that animates the private rights theory, see infra notes 130–33 and accompanying text.
4. See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 2, at 1954–56.
5. See id. at 1957–58.
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fest in the Supreme Court’s familiar framework of tiered
means-ends scrutiny, which allows many government restrictions on speech to survive First Amendment review.6
The Supreme Court frequently recites the aphorism that
political expression has special significance under the First
Amendment.7 Its decisions, however, have paved the way for
the present governmental assault on political dissent8 by demonstrating how the private rights theory’s balancing methodology serves to validate restrictions on political speech. In its
most blatant use of balancing to enforce political orthodoxy, the
Court in Barenblatt v. United States upheld an academic’s conviction for refusing to testify before Congress about his past political associations.9 Other decisions have turned on the Court’s
subjecting speech restrictions deemed content-neutral, and restrictions that apply to speech on government property not traditionally open for expressive activity, to more lenient judicial
review than it imposes on content-based regulations of speech
on private property or in “public forums.” Illustrative is Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, in which advocates for
increased government attention to the problem of homelessness

6. See id. at 1958–59. Frederick Schauer has explained this sort of balancing imperative in rights jurisprudence: “The broader the scope of the right,
the more likely it is to be weaker, largely because widening the scope increases
the likelihood of conflict with other interests, some of which may be equally or
more important.” FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 134–35 (1982).
7. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (emphasizing the
need for First Amendment protection of cross burning that constitutes “core
political speech”); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774
(2002) (claiming that “speech about the qualifications of candidates for public
office” is “a category of speech that is ‘at the core of our First Amendment freedoms’” (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 861 (8th Cir.
2001), rev’d sub nom. White, 536 U.S. at 788)); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC,
528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000) (echoing a statement in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S 1,
15 (1976) (per curiam), that “the constitutional [First Amendment] guarantee
has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office”); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525
U.S. 182, 186–87 (1999) (characterizing First Amendment protection as “at its
zenith” for “core political speech” (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422,
425 (1988))).
8. For a detailed discussion of recent government suppression of political
debate, some of it sanctioned by federal courts, see infra Part I.A.2.
9. See 360 U.S. 109, 125–34 (1959). The Barenblatt Court struck the balance in the government’s favor based on the importance of “inquiring into the
extent to which the Communist Party has succeeded in infiltrating into our
universities, or elsewhere, persons and groups committed to furthering the objective of overthrow [of the government].” Id. at 129.
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sought to dramatize their agenda by sleeping in tents erected
in Lafayette Square Park, in view of the White House.10 The
Court, ignoring the distinctive impact of this form of political
advocacy, allowed the government to suppress it under a regulation that restricted sleeping in national parks.11 The private
rights theory has allowed the Court to uphold restrictions on
political expression in other cases by deeming a speaker’s invocation of regulatory mandates to allow expression, and not a
government-facilitated decision to restrict speech, as the “public” action subject to constitutional sanction. In CBS v. Democratic National Committee, for example, the Court rejected antiwar advertisers’ First Amendment challenge to the major
broadcast networks’ refusal to sell them advertising time.12 A
plurality dismissed out of hand the idea that the networks’ public licenses imbued them with quasi-governmental authority
and thus First Amendment obligations.13
A series of First Amendment theorists beginning with
Alexander Meiklejohn14 has developed the public rights theory
of expressive freedom,15 an alternative vision of the Free
Speech Clause that contrasts sharply with the private rights
theory. The public rights theory views the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment not as a negative protection
10. 468 U.S. 288, 291–92 (1984).
11. See id. at 293–99. To reach its result, the Clark Court applied a deferential species of intermediate scrutiny. See id. at 293–94 (stating that “restrictions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information”) (citations omitted). For a
similar ruling in a different setting, see Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc., which upheld restrictions on political groups’ access to a public employee charity campaign on the ground that the campaign
was government property and a “nonpublic forum.” 473 U.S. 788, 805–06, 813
(1985).
12. 412 U.S. 94, 97, 132 (1973).
13. See id. at 121 (“Application of [First Amendment] standards to broadcast licensees would be antithetical to the very ideal of vigorous, challenging
debate on issues of public interest.”).
14. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960).
15. For a detailed portrayal of the public rights theory, see Magarian,
Public Rights, supra note 2, at 1972–90. The most important contributors to
the public rights tradition after Meiklejohn are Owen Fiss and Cass Sunstein.
See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405
(1986); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987) [hereinafter Fiss, Why the State?]; Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 255 (1992).
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against government interference with personal autonomy but
rather as a Madisonian means to the end of democratic government.16 Under the public rights theory, the central purpose
of the Free Speech Clause is to ensure that members of the political community receive the information they need to make informed decisions about matters of public policy.17 That purpose
is both narrow and critically important. Accordingly, the public
rights theory rejects the balancing methodology of the private
rights theory in favor of a categorical approach that would give
the First Amendment virtually absolute force against threats to
political discourse.18 The practical consequence of the public
rights theory is that the government may restrict access to political expression—in Meiklejohn’s phrase, “the consideration of
matters of public interest”19—only where necessary to safeguard political debate itself.20 Writing in the late 1940s and
early 1950s, he saw pressing national challenges that made
pluralistic, participatory democracy critically important, even
as governmental and societal pressures strangled the political
dissent necessary for democratic engagement.21 Treating political speech as the central object of expressive freedom ensures
that the First Amendment will not fail in its essential purpose
of fostering and facilitating self-government.22
16. See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 2, at 1983–84. Vicki Jackson
has recently pointed out that a politically focused theory of expressive freedom
draws support from the ascent, after the First Amendment’s enactment, of
equal citizenship and popular election of representatives as central features in
our constitutional order. See Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, Comparative Constitutionalism, and Fiss-ian Freedoms, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 265,
295 & n.119 (2003).
17. See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 2, at 1983–85.
18. See id. at 1987–88.
19. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 79.
20. See id. at 48–49. Meiklejohn drew this idea from Justice Brandeis’s
concurrence in Whitney v. California, from which he approvingly quoted the
proposition that “no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may
befall before there is opportunity for full discussion.” See 274 U.S. 357, 377
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), quoted in MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 48.
21. For a detailed account of Meiklejohn’s intellectual process in developing his First Amendment theory, with particular attention given to the influence of anticommunism run amok, see ADAM R. NELSON, EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY: THE MEANING OF ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN 1872–1964, at 263–95
(2001).
22. Eminent First Amendment theorists have suggested that, in addition
to democracy and autonomy, expression’s essential role in the search for truth
justifies constitutional expressive freedom. See Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the importance of
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Focusing the First Amendment on political speech, however, requires a critical trade-off. If the First Amendment is to
provide virtually absolute protection for political discourse,
then courts must categorically distinguish political from nonpolitical speech. For Meiklejohn, nonpolitical expression—art, entertainment, scientific inquiry—is “private speech,” outside the
logical boundaries of First Amendment protection.23 Like a
sailor who throws excess weight off a sinking ship, Meiklejohn
calls for sacrificing what he considers less essential categories
of speech in order to ensure thorough protection of the one
category—political speech—most integral to the nation’s democratic fortunes. Only a trade-off of broad protection, which
encompasses a wide range of speech but subjects it to judicial
balancing against countervailing regulatory priorities, for deep
protection, limited to political speech but virtually absolute in
its resistance to suppression, will lead to a First Amendment
regime sufficient to protect vigorous political debate and dissent.24
No less distinguished a pair of strange bedfellows than
Robert Bork and Cass Sunstein has elaborated the case for limiting the First Amendment’s scope to encompass only political
speech, although their arguments follow widely divergent
courses of reasoning. According to Bork, courts must focus the
First Amendment on political expression in order to avoid the
judicial activism that protecting any less constitutionally
grounded categories of expression would entail.25 For Sunstein,
reserving the First Amendment’s core for political speech would
both effectuate the Constitution’s central purpose of fostering

testing assertions justifies First Amendment protection for speech); Thomas I.
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
881–82 (1963) (including “attainment of truth” among principal justifications
for expressive freedom). The public and private rights theories offer normatively opposed ways of thinking about expressive freedom, with each taking
account of the search for truth to the extent that search serves the ends of, respectively, collective political decision making or individual autonomy.
23. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 79–80 (discussing private speech
generally); id. at 83–84 (characterizing scholarly pursuits, particularly in the
sciences, as partially private); id. at 86–88 (criticizing commercial radio as reflecting private rather than public interests).
24. See id. at 78–79.
25. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971). Even as Bork advocates the centrality of
political expression, he departs significantly from the public rights theory by
endorsing criminalization of speech that advocates forcible overthrow of the
government. See id.
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public deliberation and leave speech that hinders the development of popular sovereignty open to certain kinds of regulation.26 Although Bork and Sunstein make forceful arguments
for elevating political speech to First Amendment primacy, neither has put a dent in the Court’s commitment to the private
rights theory. One reason for their lack of influence is their inability to match the historical urgency of Meiklejohn’s
McCarthy-era plea for political openness: Bork’s article appeared in 1971, during a golden age of judicial support for political dissent,27 while Sunstein wrote in 1992, amid an era of
relative national calm.
2. The Current Surge in Suppression of Political Speech
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, set events into
motion that buttress the public rights theory’s call to circle the
First Amendment’s wagons around political speech. Our government’s war on terrorism has fostered a climate of hostility
toward political dissent in the United States unseen since
Meiklejohn’s time. Elsewhere I have documented the recent increase in nongovernmental institutions’ suppression of political
debate and dissent.28 In the more traditional zone of First
Amendment concern, federal and state law enforcement officials since 2001 have dramatically increased their efforts to intimidate, marginalize, and silence political dissenters. These
efforts have chilled dissent and exerted enormous pressure toward political conformity. A statement by the California AntiTerrorism Information Center exemplifies the present atmosphere: “[I]f you have a protest group protesting a war where the
cause that’s being fought against is international terrorism,
you might have terrorism at that protest . . . . You can almost

26. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 305.
27. That year brought the most profound and farthest reaching majority
opinion the Supreme Court has ever delivered about the value of speech generally and political dissent in particular. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
20–21, 26 (1971) (reversing on First Amendment grounds the conviction of a
man who displayed a jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” in a county
courthouse; noting that the defendant’s speech did not constitute “fighting
words”; and rejecting an asserted state interest in protecting the sensibilities
of the public, noting that an observer could simply “avert[ ] their eyes”).
28. See Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private
Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 115–27 (2004) [hereinafter Magarian, Wartime Debate].
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argue that a protest against that is a terrorist act.”29 In the few
instances when federal courts have entertained First Amendment challenges to the government’s recent attacks on political
dissent, they have employed the balancing methodology of the
private rights theory to justify those attacks.30 Most muffled
dissenters have never even gone to court, many certainly because of the costs of litigation but others, no doubt, because
they have concluded from the shape of present free speech doctrine that a court would only validate government censorship.31
Law enforcement began to display increased antipathy toward political protestors in November 1999, when Seattle police greeted protestors against a World Trade Organization
meeting with pepper spray, concussion grenades, and rubber
bullets, and the mayor created a “no protest zone” around the
Seattle Convention Center.32 In the wake of the Seattle debacle, cities that host high-profile public events have routinely invoked law enforcement necessity to restrict protestors to distant, cramped ghettoes—dubbed, in an Orwellian flourish that
swallows irony like a black hole, “free speech zones.”33 This tactic, which absurdly overreaches legitimate security needs, prevents dissenting voices from challenging the potent propaganda
of major public spectacles and expanding public debate about
important issues. During the 2000 Democratic National Convention, for example, the Los Angeles Police Department established a security perimeter around the Staples Center that kept
protestors 260 yards away from convention delegates.34 In that
case, however, a federal judge ruled the perimeter unconstitu-

29. Michelle Goldberg, Outlawing Dissent, SALON.COM, Feb. 11, 2004,
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2004/02/11/cointelpro/print.html (quoting Mike Van Winkle, spokesman for the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center).
30. See Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat’l Convention v. City of Boston,
327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 66–76 (D. Mass. 2004), aff ’d sub nom. Bl(a)ack Tea Soc’y v.
City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2004); Nat’l Council of Arab Ams. v.
City of N.Y., 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 258, 265–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
31. For a discussion of present free speech doctrine’s insufficient protection of political debate and dissent beyond the incidents discussed in this section, see supra notes 7–13 and accompanying text.
32. See Patrick F. Gillham & Gary T. Marx, Complexity and Irony in Policing and Protesting: The World Trade Organization in Seattle, 27 SOC. JUST.
212, 217 (2000).
33. Dave Lindorff, Keeping Dissent Invisible, SALON.COM, Oct. 16, 2003,
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2003/10/16/secret_service/print.html.
34. Serv. Employees Int’l Union v. City of L.A., 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968
(C.D. Cal. 2000).
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tional, finding its size and around-the-clock enforcement not
narrowly tailored to the government’s interest in public
safety.35 That decision reflects what we usually assume to be
the axiomatic First Amendment protection of political protest.36
Unfortunately, the September 11 attacks eroded courts’ resolve against antiprotest measures. In July 2004, two protest
groups requested a preliminary injunction to prevent the City
of Boston from designating a 300-foot by 90-foot space under
abandoned subway tracks as the “free speech zone” for the 2004
Democratic National Convention.37 The zone was “surrounded
by two rows of concrete jersey barriers,” each topped with an
eight-foot-high chain-link fence covered in tightly woven mesh
fabric.38 Looser mesh netting attached the top of the fence to
the subway tracks above, which were wrapped in razor wire.39
A federal judge described the space as “a grim, mean, and oppressive space” that created an impression “of an internment
camp” or “a holding pen where potentially dangerous persons
are separated from others.”40 He stressed that the design of the
zone “is an offense to the spirit of the First Amendment[,] . . . a
brutish and potentially unsafe place for citizens who wish to
exercise their First Amendment rights.”41 Nonetheless, he refused to enjoin the zone, citing the constraints of the physical
location and law enforcement’s safety concerns as barriers to a
solution that would “vindicate plaintiffs’ First Amendment
rights.”42 Less than a month later, another federal judge sustained the New York City Parks Department’s decision to deny
the National Council of Arab Americans a permit to protest on
the Great Lawn during the 2004 Republican National Convention.43 Although the court acknowledged the site’s symbolic

35. See id. at 971 (holding that a designated security zone unconstitutionally infringed protestors’ First Amendment rights).
36. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (invoking the
First Amendment to overturn the conviction of an antidraft protestor for wearing a “Fuck the Draft” jacket in a courthouse).
37. Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat’l Convention v. City of Boston,
327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 66 (D. Mass. 2004), aff ’d sub nom. Bal(a)ack Tea Soc’y v.
City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2004).
38. Id. at 67.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 67, 74–75.
41. Id. at 76.
42. Id.
43. See Nat’l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of N.Y., 331 F. Supp. 2d 258,
268 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (characterizing the defendants’ interest in maintaining
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value for the protestors, it held that the government’s interest
in maintaining the park outweighed their interest in symbolic
expression.44
Venturing outside their cages has gotten protestors arrested. In October 2003, federal agents arrested a retired
steelworker and his sister after they refused to move their antiBush sign to a designated “free speech area” at a campaign
rally in Pittsburgh.45 Based on this and numerous similar incidents, the ACLU filed suit against the Secret Service, contending that segregating protestors violated their constitutional
rights.46 Although the Secret Service pledged to discontinue
segregating protestors,47 the practice continues. When President Bush appeared at the West Virginia Capitol for a July 4,
2004 campaign rally, police arrested a young couple wearing
anti-Bush t-shirts and charged them with trespassing—on public property.48 In September 2004, a woman wearing a t-shirt
stenciled with “President Bush You Killed My Son,” to protest
her son’s death in Iraq, shouted questions at First Lady Laura
Bush during a campaign speech.49 New Jersey police arrested
her for defiant trespass even though she said she had a ticket
to attend the rally.50 In other cases, people seeking to attend

and managing a public park as a significant government interest).
44. See id. at 258, 265–66 (recognizing the plaintiffs’ belief that the location was symbolic but denying the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction due to the doctrine of laches and the plaintiffs’ failure to show a likelihood
of success on the merits).
45. Lindorff, supra note 33 (documenting a protestor’s arrest for disorderly conduct when he refused to relocate to a segregated area behind a chainlink fence to display a sign that read “The Bushes must love the poor—they’ve
made so many of us”).
46. See id. (describing ACLU findings of at least seventeen similar incidents and an ACLU suit against the Secret Service).
47. See Jennifer Bundy, Couple Arrested for Wearing Anti-Bush T-shirts to
W. Va. Event Sues Federal Officials, N. COUNTY TIMES, Sept. 14, 2004, available at http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2004/09/14/news/nation/16_51_349_
14_04.prt (noting that the Secret Service agreed to discontinue its segregation
policy).
48. Id.
49. Soldier’s Mom Interrupts Laura Bush’s Speech, CNN.COM, Sept. 20,
2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/09/17/bush.protester/index
.html. The Secret Service contemplated whether the woman, Sue Niederer,
had violated a federal law banning threats to kill the president when she told
an online magazine that “she wanted to ‘rip the president’s head off.’” Secret
Service Reviews Comments By Dead Soldier’s Mom, WNBC.COM, Sept. 22,
2004, http://www.wnbc.com/print/3751305/detail.html.
50. Soldier’s Mom Interrupts Laura Bush’s Speech, supra note 49.
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speeches by President Bush have reported being ejected or
barred simply because of their perceived opposition to administration policies.51
Government officials since the 2001 attacks have also used
increasingly aggressive investigation and questioning to intimidate people who express dissenting political views. In November 2001, FBI and Secret Service agents appeared at a
small Houston art museum and interrogated a curator for over
an hour about a new exhibit called Secret Wars, which focused
on covert government operations.52 In November 2003, the U.S.
Attorney’s Office in Iowa served Drake University with a subpoena demanding information about an on-campus antiwar
demonstration sponsored by the University’s National Lawyers’
Guild chapter.53 The government claimed the subpoena was
necessary for the investigation of a single trespassing incident
on nearby National Guard property.54 Only mounting public
pressure led the U.S. Attorney to withdraw the subpoena in
February 2004.55 FBI officials have interrogated political demonstrators in advance of several public events, including the
2004 Democratic and Republican National Conventions.56 The
Department of Justice has also investigated people associated
with Internet sites the government deems subversive of U.S.
interests.57 Relying extensively on its powers under the U.S.A.
Patriot Act,58 the Department has charged website owners
51. See Ron Hutcheson, Bush Backers Allegedly Keep Dissenters Away,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 31, 2005, at A4 (discussing the ejection of Iraq War opponents in Denver, Colorado, and blacklisting of Democrats in Fargo, North
Dakota).
52. Kris Axtman, Political Dissent Can Bring Federal Agents to Door,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 8, 2002, at 1.
53. Monica Davey, Subpoenas on Antiwar Protest Are Dropped, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2004, at A18 (discussing a subpoena issued to Drake University for participant and content information about a National Lawyers’ Guildsponsored antiwar forum).
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. See Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Goes Knocking for Political Troublemakers,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2004, at A1 (discussing FBI interviews of “past protestors
and their friends and family members” in six states in weeks prior to both
2004 political conventions).
57. Eric Lipton & Eric Lichtblau, Online and Even Near Home, a New
Front Is Opening in the Global Terror Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at
A12.
58. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (U.S.A. Patriot) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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whose sites contain incendiary information with “provid[ing]
‘expert advice or assistance’” to terrorists.59 Other objects of
FBI and Secret Service attention have included a middle-aged
Californian who criticized President Bush’s ties to oil companies during a conversation at his gym60 and a North Carolina
college freshman who displayed a poster in her dorm room that
criticized President Bush’s record on capital punishment as
governor of Texas.61
Numerous people who have mounted peaceful protests
against the present government have paid for their efforts in
blood, liberty, or positions in government institutions. In November 2001, the School of the Americas, a controversial operation that trains foreign nationals in military tactics, cracked
down on an annual, nonviolent demonstration at Fort Bening,
claiming the protest “was not appropriate during the war on
terrorism.”62 Although the event remained nonviolent, lawenforcement officials arrested and prosecuted dozens of protestors on trespassing charges.63 A year later, Miami police attacked protestors who marched in opposition to a Free Trade
Area of the Americas meeting.64 When police announced over a
bullhorn that the demonstration would continue only if it re59. Lipton & Lichtblau, supra note 57. In 2003, the government leveled
such charges against Sami Omar al-Hussayen, a recently emigrated PhD candidate, after he established websites that were devoted to Middle East news
and cheered suicide attacks. See id. A judge allowed the case to reach a jury.
See id. Despite scouring “files and files and files of evidence,” the jurors acquitted al-Hussayen because they could find no evidence that he was affiliated
with a terrorist organization. Id. (quoting a juror). Similar charges are pending against a British citizen, but British authorities have so far refused to extradite the defendant to the United States. See id. (discussing charges pending
against Babar Ahmad in federal district court in Connecticut).
60. See Axtman, supra note 52.
61. See id. For a discussion of other recent instances in which federal law
enforcement officers have investigated or pressured people who displayed or
created works that satirized the Bush administration, see Lauren Gilbert,
Mocking George: Political Satire as “True Threat” in the Age of Global Terrorism, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 843, 847–53 (2004).
62. Alisa Solomon, Things We Lost in the Fire, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 11–
17, 2002, at 32 (quoting Father Roy Bourgeois, founder of School of the Americas Watch).
63. Id.
64. See Ben Manski, Massacre in Miami? It Was a Defeat for Protestors,
CAP. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2003, at 13A. Miami police had prepared for the meeting
by stockpiling riot gear, erecting “an 8-foot high security fence around the protest zone,” and setting up a “rumor control” hotline to field calls about alleged
protests. Tamara Lush, Trade Talks Put Miami on Edge, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at 1A.
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mained peaceful, a protestor responded, “Does that include police violence?”65 The police replied with batons, tear gas, rubber
bullets, pepper spray, and concussion grenades.66 The congressionally funded United States Institute of Peace forced a conflict resolution trainer to resign because of her public statements criticizing U.S. foreign policy.67 The University of South
Florida fired a tenured professor for harshly criticizing Israel.68
A West Virginia high school suspended a student for wearing a
t-shirt that said “Racism, Sexism, Homophobia, I’m So Proud of
People in the Land of the So-Called Free,” and the West Virginia Supreme Court upheld the suspension.69 These actions
took place despite the First Amendment’s ostensible protection
of political expression by public employees70 and students.71
The Supreme Court has held that infiltration and monitoring of
peaceful political groups violates political dissenters’ First
Amendment right of political association.72 It also offends First
Amendment principles by casting the very act of opposing the
government as legally suspect, and—if the government strategically publicizes the monitoring—by chilling expression.73
Nonetheless, government infiltration and monitoring of dissenters, so infamous from the days of McCarthyism and COINTELPRO,74 has reemerged during the present campaign
against terrorism. After the September 11 attacks, Attorney
General John Ashcroft loosened guidelines for federal investigations in order to ensure that “if there is a rally of people who

65. Manski, supra note 64.
66. See id.
67. See Matthew Rothschild, The New McCarthyism, PROGRESSIVE, Jan.
2002, at 19.
68. See Solomon, supra note 62.
69. See Rothschild, supra note 67, at 20.
70. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 574 (1968) (holding
that the First Amendment barred the board of education from firing a teacher
for making public statements criticizing the board’s policies).
71. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)
(holding that the First Amendment barred a public school from suspending
students for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War).
72. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (rejecting on First
Amendment grounds a state’s demand for a civil rights group’s membership
list).
73. See Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1319 (2004) (discussing the chilling effect
on First Amendment rights of government surveillance and infiltration of political dissenters).
74. See Goldberg, supra note 29.
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are criticizing the United States and its policies and saying
that the United States will someday perhaps be destroyed because of that, the FBI agent can go and listen to what’s being
said.”75 In 2003, the FBI encouraged local law enforcement officials to monitor antiwar groups and political protests for signs
of terrorist activity,76 and the federal government has poured
funding into local “red squads.”77 When an FBI employee argued that those mandates confused protected speech with illegal activity, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel
declared the activity constitutionally appropriate.78 Since then,
groups across the nation, including the Colorado Coalition
Against the War, the American Friends Service Committee,
and Peace Fresno have reported undercover officers infiltrating
their organizations.79
In an effort to publicize government assaults on political
dissent, the ACLU and the Center for National Security Studies filed Freedom of Information Act requests for statistics regarding the Justice Department’s post-September 11 activities.80 When the Department denied each request, the groups
filed suit in federal district court; in each case, the court sided
with the government.81 One federal judge upheld the Justice
Department’s refusal to release general statistics regarding its
use of various surveillance and investigatory tools authorized
by the Patriot Act, holding that the Department’s interest in
protecting national security justified secrecy.82 Another federal
judge held that the Patriot Act’s national security exemption
protected the Department’s refusal to turn over statistics regarding the frequency of its requests for “tangible things in an
75. Id. (quoting Attorney General Ashcroft in a 2002 interview).
76. See Lichtblau, supra note 56 (discussing FBI requests to local law enforcement agencies regarding monitoring of political dissenters and an internal complaint filed by an FBI employee citing concerns about the requests’ infringement of constitutional free speech protections).
77. See Solomon, supra note 62 (discussing government infiltration tactics).
78. See Lichtblau, supra note 56 (“Given the limited nature of such public
monitoring, any possible ‘chilling’ effect caused by the bulletins would be quite
minimal and substantially outweighed by the public interest in maintaining
safety and order during large-scale demonstrations.” (quoting a Department of
Justice opinion)).
79. See Goldberg, supra note 29.
80. See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C.
2004); ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 21 (D.D.C. 2003).
81. See 321 F. Supp. 2d at 38; 265 F. Supp. 2d at 34–35.
82. See 265 F. Supp. 2d at 31.
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‘authorized investigation.’”83 The court cited longstanding deference to the Executive Branch regarding national security
matters and asserted judicial incompetence to “second-guess
the executive’s judgment” on national security.84 Public access
to information about the workings of government is essential in
a democratic society. These decisions, however, validated what
has been an unprecedented government effort to shield such information from public scrutiny.85
The First Amendment is supposed to ensure that the news
media can vigorously pursue and report news about government actions and proceedings.86 But the Bush administration,
through control of access to information and occasional overt
pressure, has eviscerated the news media’s traditional watchdog role, a process that media corporations’ frequent selfcensorship has made shamefully easy.87 One particularly important instance of heightened government secrecy is a federal
policy, issued within days of the 2001 attacks and altering decades of past practice, of reflexively closing deportation hearings
on national security grounds.88 Under that policy, the Depart-

83. See 321 F. Supp. 2d at 26, 37.
84. Id. at 30.
85. See Eric Lichtblau, Government Shrinking Access to Information,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 22, 2001, at 28A (describing the general increase in government secrecy in the wake of the September 11 attacks); On the
Public’s Right To Know: The Day Ashcroft Censored Freedom of Information,
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 6, 2002, at D4 (discussing a memorandum from Attorney
General John Ashcroft that “vigorously urged federal agencies to resist most
Freedom of Information Act requests made by American citizens”).
86. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980)
(holding that “the right [of the press and public] to attend criminal trials is
implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment”); N.Y. Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (refusing to enjoin publication of
the Pentagon Papers, leaked government documents related to national security).
87. See Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note 28, at 117–21 (documenting instances of misinformation and suppression of information by U.S. news
media since the 2001 terrorist attacks). The Bush administration’s unprecedented promotion of its policies via Potemkin journalists—including secret
payments to opinion commentators, production and distribution of fake television news segments, and issuance of White House press credentials to an incognito conservative activist—has exacerbated the failures of real media outlets. See Frank Rich, The White House Stages Its “Daily Show,” N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2005, at B1 (describing the Bush administration’s disinformation tactics).
88. See Directive of Michael Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to All Immigration Judges and Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2001), http://news
.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf [hereinafter Creppy Di-
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ment of Justice holds unfettered discretion to designate any
immigration proceeding a “special interest” matter, based on a
belief that the immigrant “might have connections with, or possess information pertaining to, terrorist activities against the
United States.”89 A “special interest” designation requires
courts to seal the case file; remove the case from the docket;
and bar the detainee’s family, visitors, and reporters from the
proceedings.90 This policy has allowed the government to decide
the fates of hundreds of immigrants without the accountability
that open proceedings ensure.91 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has upheld the policy against constitutional challenge,92 although the Sixth Circuit has disagreed;93
meanwhile, the D.C. Circuit has upheld the government’s refusal even to provide a count of hearings closed under the policy.94

rective]. The Creppy Directive altered a longstanding policy that deportation
proceedings were open to the public. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303
F.3d 681, 701 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Since 1965, INS regulations have explicitly required deportation hearings to be presumptively open.”).
89. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir.
2002) (quoting a declaration by Dale L. Watson, Executive Assistant Director
for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence at the FBI), cert. denied, 538
U.S. 1056 (2003).
90. See Creppy Directive, supra note 88.
91. An estimated 600 detainees endured closed hearings through mid2003. See Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond:
Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 95, 95–96 (2004) (citing a figure provided by Solicitor General Theodore Olsen in a brief opposing writ of certiorari in North Jersey Media Group).
Despite evidence that almost none of the people subjected to closed deportation hearings have terrorist connections, the Department of Justice has continued to close hearings. See id. at 96 & n.8 (noting the Department’s acknowledgment that most detainees did not have information regarding
terrorist activities). The Department has publicly suggested it may reconsider
the Creppy Directive. See Behind Closed Doors, INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 31,
2003, at 6 (quoting the Department as saying that procedures for closed hearings might “likely be revised”). At this time, however, the policy appears unchanged.
92. See N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 221 (holding the Creppy Directive constitutional under the analysis set forth in Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980)).
93. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701 (holding the Creppy Directive
unconstitutional under the analysis set forth in Richmond Newspapers, 448
U.S. at 575).
94. See Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918,
921 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (sustaining the Department of Justice’s right to deny a
Freedom of Information Act request concerning INS detainees), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1104 (2004).
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The threat of unaccountable deportation does not, of
course, represent our government’s only recent assault on resident foreign nationals. The Court has held that the First
Amendment protects the expressive rights of noncitizens,95 and
this protection increases the presence of diverse viewpoints in
domestic political debate.96 Those considerations, however,
have not stopped the government from using the exceptional
leverage it holds over foreign nationals in the United States to
suppress their political association and expression.97 Government actions, most prominently the broad and seemingly arbitrary practice of questioning and often detaining noncitizens for
alleged associations with asserted terrorists, have effectively
chilled immigrant communities from speaking out on political
issues that strongly affect their interests.98
Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, the First Amendment has
failed in its essential task of protecting political dissent. That
failure provides powerful support for the trade-off urged by the
public rights theory of expressive freedom: narrow the scope of
the Free Speech Clause to cover only political expression in order to deepen protection of that most essential category of
speech by eliminating the balancing of political expression
against government regulatory interests.99 That trade-off would
improve upon the present state of constitutional protection for
political debate and dissent in numerous ways. First, the public
rights theory would compel courts to extend political expression
far greater protection against government regulation than it
currently enjoys. Unless the government could justify a re-

95. “Freedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this
country.” Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), which overturned a contempt-of-court conviction of
an alien labor leader that rested on a telegram to the Secretary of Labor about
a pending case).
96. Cf. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 119 (contending “that unhindered
expression must be open to non-citizens, to resident aliens, to writers and
speakers of other nations, to anyone, past or present, who has something to
say which may have significance for a citizen who is thinking of the welfare of
this nation”).
97. See Solomon, supra note 62 (discussing the broad powers of the Attorney General to identify and detain noncitizens suspected of “terrorist” ties under the U.S.A. Patriot Act). Many Muslim Americans fear even appearing at
community events. See, e.g., id. (discussing decreased attendance at a Brooklyn Pakistani community festival).
98. See id.
99. See supra notes 14–27 and accompanying text.
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straint on political debate as needed to protect political debate
itself, the public rights theory would impose a rigorous presumption against the restraint. Second, more dissenters who
faced government sanction would have reason to avail themselves of judicial process, because courts’ adjudications of First
Amendment cases would send a consistent message that our
legal system took constitutional protection of political debate
seriously. Third, the public rights theory’s emphasis on robust
political debate as the necessary bottom line of First Amendment doctrine would justify courts in blocking even some nongovernmental constraints on public political debate, at least in
wartime.100 Fourth, that same bottom-line view of expressive
freedom would produce a more open and dynamic political
process that would widen the variety of viewpoints present in
public political debate.101
Making political speech the exclusive object of First
Amendment protection would bring impressive benefits. The
public rights theory’s problem, however, is that its proposed
trade-off of broadly protecting all speech for deeply protecting
only political speech entails steep, arguably intolerable costs in
exposure of nonpolitical speech to official suppression.
B. PROBLEMS WITH PROTECTING ONLY POLITICAL SPEECH
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
1. Distinguishing Political Speech
Although this Article concentrates on the doctrinal consequences of limiting the First Amendment to protection of political speech,102 the discussion will benefit from consideration of a
logically prior problem: the need to distinguish political from
nonpolitical speech. Meiklejohn acknowledged that “[t]he human relations involved in the distinction between the general
welfare and individual advantage are deeply and permanently
perplexing.”103 Is art political? Does the arguably transgressive
character of pornography render it political? What about commercial information that affects important consumer decisions?
Even if any or all of these categories of speech are not inher-

100.
101.
102.
103.

See Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note 28, at 150–68.
See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 2, at 2010–60.
See infra Part I.B.2.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 81.
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ently political, do they acquire political character whenever attempts at official censorship make them objects of political controversy?104
Line-drawing problems inhere in the necessary task of providing a theoretical explanation for expressive freedom.105 The
dominant private rights theory of expressive freedom,106 which
rejects categorization of types of speech, nevertheless entails at
least three problematic exercises in line drawing. First, because
some concept must bound the First Amendment’s constraint on
government authority, the private rights theory’s disdain for
categorical distinctions requires it to stake a great deal on the
notoriously elusive distinction between speech and action.107
Second, the private rights theory’s balancing methodology requires identifying and comparing distinct regulatory and expressive values.108 This balancing process impels courts both to
assess the relative importance of different sorts of expressive
conduct109 and to determine whether a government regulatory
interest somehow outweighs a conceptually incommensurable
expressive interest.110 Third, the private rights theory’s nega-

104. Critics of the theory have repeatedly noted this problem. Objections to
Meiklejohn’s distinction between public and private speech immediately
formed the leading attack on his First Amendment theory. See NELSON, supra
note 21, at 270–74 (summarizing and discussing early criticisms). Leading examples include Robert C. Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy
and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1117 (1993)
(arguing that Meiklejohn “violates th[e] necessary indeterminacy of public discourse” by limiting what can count as political); Martin H. Redish, The Value
of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 596–97 (1982) (criticizing Meiklejohn’s
line drawing); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV.
1212, 1225–39 (1983) (arguing against a distinction between political and
commercial speech).
105. For the leading explanation of the need for some theory to ground free
speech doctrine, see Emerson, supra note 22, at 877–78.
106. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text (describing the private
rights theory).
107. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487–88 (1993) (upholding a penalty enhancement for racially motivated crime because the enhancement targeted “bias-inspired conduct” rather than expression).
108. See supra notes 7–13 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1976) (per curiam) (concluding that political contributions have less expressive value than political
expenditures).
110. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 357–
70 (1997) (assessing minor parties’ expressive interest in having the option to
choose another party’s nominee as its own “fusion” nominee, assessing the
state’s asserted political stability interests in banning fusion candidacies, and
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tive model of expressive rights places defining emphasis on a
rigid distinction between the ephemeral categories of “public”
and “private.”111 Resolving any First Amendment theory’s linedrawing problems requires difficult judgments about whatever
factors the theory emphasizes in defining expressive freedom.
Theorists in the public rights tradition have tried to generate a strict definition of political speech. Meiklejohn defines the
proper class of protected expression as limited to “speech which
bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues with which voters have
to deal . . . , to the consideration of matters of public interest.”112 Sunstein “treat[s] speech as political when it is both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation
about some issue.”113 These attempts to define political speech
share two problems. First, they fail to achieve any clear, satisfying delineation. Meiklejohn’s “directly or indirectly,” Sunstein’s reliance on subjective intent and perception, and their
shared emphasis on the uncertain notion of public affairs seem
to preclude a stable understanding of which speech counts as
“political.” Second, even if we could arrive at a fixed, stable
definition of “political speech,” judicial reliance on that definition might stunt growth over time in our understanding of
what concerns should become subjects of collective societal deliberation and resolution. Such a definition, for example, might
have interfered with our society’s emerging awareness over the
past half century of the relationship between sexual identity
and political change.114 Thus, a stable conception of “political
speech” appears impossible at best and undesirable at worst.
Efforts to define political speech offer promise, however, if
we resist the allure of stability and instead consider “politics”
as a dynamic concept.115 On this understanding, the category of

concluding that the latter outweighed the former).
111. See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 2, at 1956–58 (explaining the
private rights theory’s reliance on the public-private distinction to vindicate a
negative right to expressive freedom). For a thorough critique of the publicprivate distinction in the context of First Amendment doctrine, see Magarian,
Wartime Debate, supra note 28, at 127–50.
112. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 79.
113. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 304.
114. See generally GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Walter L. Williams & Yolanda Retter eds., 2003)
(discussing sexual minorities’ struggle for rights against the dominant views of
society).
115. I have previously advocated a similar distinction in the practice of
partisan politics in the United States. See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note
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“political speech” attains distinction not lexically but functionally. Meiklejohn wrote much less about what political speech is
than about what it does: it presents “squarely and fearlessly
everything that can be said in favor of [governing] institutions,
everything that can be said against them.”116 In his foundational explanation of expressive freedom as a public right,
“[t]he principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-government.”117 Accordingly, a
practical distinction of political speech transcends any single,
abstract inquiry, requiring instead an ongoing examination
that encompasses both theoretical inquiry and concrete adjudication.
Although the Supreme Court knows how to differentiate
constitutional speech protection based on distinctions among
explicit categories of speech,118 it probably would implement
the public rights theory most effectively not by attempting a
rigid delineation of political speech but rather by examining in
any given case whether a burden on speech undermined discourse best understood as concerning matters of public deliberation or, in contrast, undermined speech best understood as
serving some individual’s interest in personal autonomy. The
Court has shown an understanding of how to draw exactly this
sort of distinction in more limited First Amendment contexts.
In a defamation case, the court will afford a defendant’s allegedly defamatory statement heightened insulation from liability
if the statement’s object is a “public official”119 or a “public fig2, at 1996–2003 (setting forth the dynamic party politics theory of political
parties’ role in elections).
116. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 77.
117. Id. at 27. Professor Fiss, another leading architect of the public rights
theory, similarly advocates a “public debate principle” of expressive freedom,
under which “[state] action is judged by its impact on public debate, a social
state of affairs.” Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 15, at 786.
118. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 761–70 (1976) (defining “commercial speech” as a category of expression entitled to less than full First Amendment protection); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining “obscenity” as a category of unprotected speech); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (defining
incitement to imminent lawless action as a category of unprotected speech);
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (defining “true threats” as a
category of unprotected speech); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268
(1964) (recognizing some defamation as a category of unprotected speech);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (defining “fighting
words” as a category of unprotected speech).
119. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (emphasizing the “profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibi-
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ure.”120 The court has insulated public employees and publishers of sensitive information from adverse actions that targeted
speech about matters of public concern.121 In evaluating media
regulations, the Court has permitted broadcast content requirements based at least in part on the idea that broadcasters,
by virtue either of their public licenses122 or their control over
communication bottlenecks,123 perform a special public function. All of these rules require functional assessments of the
public importance of certain types or means of expression—the
same sort of assessment a court would need to make if First
Amendment jurisprudence shifted toward a focus on political
expression.
The line between subjects of public and private concern
disappears at some level of abstraction.124 Certainly that line’s
ted, robust, and wide-open” in applying a more stringent standard of proof to
defamation actions brought by “public officials”).
120. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154–55 (1967) (extending
the Sullivan requirement for defamation judgments to cases brought by “public figures”).
121. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534–35 (2001) (rejecting the
application of wiretap statutes to republication of illegally obtained information because “privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in
publishing matters of public importance”); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 571, 574–75 (1968) (overturning a school board’s firing of the plaintiff for
speaking about “a matter of legitimate public concern on which the judgment
of the school administration, including the School Board, cannot, in a society
that leaves such questions to popular vote, be taken as conclusive”). Eugene
Volokh asserted that “it shouldn’t be for courts to decide what is a matter of
‘public concern’ and what isn’t,” given that “[m]ost such matters of taste are
left to individual speakers and listeners to determine.” Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 747 (2003). Volokh’s position
exemplifies the logical consequences of the private rights theory’s negative,
purposeless conception of expressive freedom. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
122. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388–90 (1969) (upholding a federal requirement of equal broadcast time for opposing political positions based on a public need to allocate broadcast frequencies through public
licenses).
123. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 656–57 (1994) (applying a lesser standard of First Amendment scrutiny to a federal “must carry”
requirement for cable systems based on cable operators’ control over a large
population’s access to an important source of information).
124. Eminent constitutional thinkers have cast the Supreme Court’s commitment to personal autonomy in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), discussed infra Part II.A, as a means of advancing democratic ideals. See Jane S.
Schacter, Lawrence v. Texas and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Democratic Aspirations, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 733, 734 (2004) (situating Lawrence in a line of Fourteenth Amendment cases concerned with “the culture
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location is a necessary and proper subject for continual reassessment.125 Understood functionally, however, political speech
has both value and vulnerability distinct from those that attach
to other categories of expression.126 Some legal impediments to
personal autonomy reflect political power differentials, but
many do not, and the fact that democratic participation requires a measure of personal autonomy does not mean that all
autonomy protections advance democratic deliberation. The
public rights theory distinguishes the benefits of expression for
democratic debate from its benefits for personal autonomy in
order to ensure a functional, robust democratic system. The
prospect of judicial determinations about the value of various
forms of expression may appear troubling, but in this area, as
in so many others, judges cannot decide anything without assessing the values at stake.127 It is better to embody such

and conditions of democracy”); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The
“Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893,
1899 (2004) (positing that “the commitments we make to our principles and to
one another, in the context of associations ranging from the most intimate to
those with the polity as a whole, constitute the essential core of constitutionalism”).
125. See Post, supra note 104, at 1116–17 (positing the “necessary indeterminacy of public discourse”). My understanding of expressive freedom owes
much to Post’s rich account of the depth to which democratic principles require
public contention to extend. See id. at 1116 (maintaining that “public discourse
must be conceptualized as an arena within which citizens are free continuously to reconcile their differences and to (re)construct a distinctive and everchanging national identity”). My difference with Post goes to his complete
trust in the economic marketplace as the sole conceivable mechanism for ensuring the freedom he extols. See id. at 1118–19 (rejecting involvement by
public institutions in achieving the democratic aims of a Meiklejohn-derived
First Amendment theory as “[m]anagerial” interference with “the value of
autonomy”). Post dismisses what he identifies, in a term that still had bite in
1993, as “collectivist” doubts about the public-private distinction and the
autonomous character of individual decisions in our society on the circular basis that those doubts threaten the conception of democracy he wishes to sustain. See id. at 1125–33. Post’s dismissal ignores real threats that nongovernmental actors pose to democracy. It is far better to give courts a role in
policing those actors than to let them police themselves.
126. See Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note 28, at 105–15 (discussing
the distinctive value and vulnerability of political debate compared to other
speech).
127. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 9–13 (1979) (contending that judges are uniquely able to evaluate and
balance competing constitutional values); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist
Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 711 (1931) (calling for a realist theory of
values and recognizing many approaches to juristic truth).
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evaluations in forthright, evolving doctrine than to pretend
that they need not occur.
2. Defying the Consensus to Protect Nonpolitical Speech
The definitional problem aside, this Article addresses a
deeper problem with confining expressive freedom under the
First Amendment to political speech: the tension that pits the
imperative to privilege politically valuable expression against
ingrained judicial practice, social norms, and intellectual commitments that compel undifferentiated First Amendment protection for most categories of speech.
The public rights theory calls for privileging political
speech under the First Amendment because political speech
has unique value for democracy. Many people, however, believe
all speech deserves an undifferentiated constitutional shield
because all speech advances personal autonomy. That belief,
which animates the private rights theory’s directive to protect
expression without regard to category, comports with the most
common conception of constitutional rights. The impetus to
protect individuals’ autonomous behavior against government
intrusion, subject in appropriate cases to superseding government regulatory interests, has deep roots in our legal tradition
and exerts a powerful hold on our understanding.128 Autonomy
strikes most people as especially salient for expressive freedom
because the act of speaking manifests the moral agency that
defines an individual in relation to other people and to the
broader community.129
The present Supreme Court has proclaimed unanimously
“the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of
his own message.”130 Although the Court has done little to
128. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENG122 n.4 (3d ed. rev., Callaghan & Co. 1884) (1765) (describing natural
rights and the limited role of government in preserving liberty); JOHN LOCKE,
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 350 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (proposing that the individual is willing to
yield some freedom to government in order to preserve “the enjoyment of the
property he has in [the state of nature]”).
129. See C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 979, 1014–15 (1997) (substantiating the common intuition that recognition of individuals’ moral agency is essential to the formation of political community).
130. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,
515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995).
LAND
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elaborate the positive value of expressive autonomy, numerous
First Amendment theorists have built sophisticated accounts of
expressive freedom around personal autonomy. Charles Fried
states the essential claim: “Freedom of expression is properly
based on autonomy: the Kantian right of each individual to be
treated as an end in himself, an equal sovereign citizen of the
kingdom of ends with a right to the greatest liberty compatible
with the like liberties of all others.”131 C. Edwin Baker maintains that courts should understand the First Amendment to
protect all speech that represents the autonomous exercise of
the speaker’s expressive capacity “because of the way the protected conduct fosters individual self-realization and selfdetermination without improperly interfering with the legitimate claims of others.”132 Martin Redish posits that the Free
Speech Clause serves entirely to advance the value of “individual self-realization,” which encompasses and supersedes the interest in a healthy democratic process.133
Some sorts of speech that have substantially or primarily
nonpolitical value, notably pornography134 and commercial
speech,135 defy consensus, leading to distinctly aberrant or in-

131. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to
Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 233 (1992).
132. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978); see also Baker, supra note 129, at 982–87 (describing considerations of expressive autonomy that justify First Amendment
protection of speech). Baker argues pointedly that the autonomy-based explanation for expressive freedom “is much more deeply intertwined with our normative commitments” than the democracy-based explanation. See id. at 1014–
17.
133. See Redish, supra note 104, at 601–05 (explaining “individual selfrealization” value in relation to democratic process value); see also Post, supra
note 104, at 1119 (conceptualizing autonomy as a value that dictates a sphere
of expressive freedom “within which heterogeneous versions of collective identity can be free continuously to collide and reconcile”).
134. The incoherence of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on pornography
began with Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the Court defined a broad category of “patently offensive” sexually explicit speech by reference to “community standards” and declared the category outside the protection the First Amendment is supposed to accord to speech that offends the
community. See id. at 24. In subsequent decisions, the Court effectively allowed the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) to ban scatological language over the radio airwaves, see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750
(1978), then struck down a congressional requirement that cable television
providers scramble sexually explicit programming, see United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000). This Article discusses a substantive due process approach to regulations of pornography infra Part III.B.
135. The Supreme Court has had difficulty even defining commercial
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coherent lines of First Amendment doctrine. But the Supreme
Court has enforced a broad societal consensus that artistic and
literary works deserve constitutional insulation from government interference without regard to their contribution, or lack
thereof, to political debate.136 Similarly, the Court’s decisions
reflect a broadly shared belief that the Constitution should protect categories of nonpolitical speech as varied as scientific inquiry,137 frank discussions about sex and sexuality,138 and
charitable appeals.139 Thus, the Court has consistently extended full First Amendment protection to those categories of
speech.140
speech. Compare Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (defining commercial speech as “speech which
does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction’” (quoting Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973))), with Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (defining commercial speech more broadly to include “expression related solely to
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience”). The Court’s approach
to protecting commercial speech remains unstable and unsettled. Compare
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (announcing a four-part intermediate scrutiny
standard for commercial speech cases), with 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (plurality opinion) (maintaining that “[t]he
mere fact that messages propose commercial transactions does not in and of
itself dictate the constitutional analysis that should apply to decisions to suppress them” and proposing more thorough protection for commercial speech in
certain circumstances). This Article discusses a substantive due process approach to regulations of commercial speech infra Part III.C.
136. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115–16 (1991) (striking down a state regulation
that imposed a financial burden on criminals who published books relating to
their crimes as invalid under the First Amendment).
137. See, e.g., Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (including “scientific value” among the
safe harbors that bring otherwise unprotected “obscenity” within First
Amendment protection).
138. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 878 (1997) (explaining that the
Court’s decision to invalidate a broad-based restriction on Internet content
was partially based on the ground that the ban might encompass “discussions
about prison rape or safe sexual practices”).
139. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 n.5 (1988) (determining that
solicitation of charitable appeals for funds is within the protection of the First
Amendment); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620,
622 (1980) (holding that the First Amendment protects solicitation of contributions by charitable organizations).
140. I exclude religious expression from this list because the First Amendment specially protects religious expression, as well as action, through the
Free Exercise Clause, at least in theory. But see Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 876–82 (1990) (limiting the prohibitive effect of the Free Exercise Clause to regulations that deliberately or discriminatorily burden religion). In fact, the Free Exercise Clause, by defining a basis for constitutional
protection without distinguishing between speech and conduct, provides the
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C. UNSATISFACTORY SOLUTIONS TO THE NONPOLITICAL SPEECH
PROBLEM
Prior advocates of the public rights theory have tried and
failed to strike the delicate but necessary balance between preserving the theory’s essence and honoring the societal consensus that nonpolitical speech deserves constitutional protection.
These previous attempts have taken two principal forms: (1)
expanding the category of political speech and (2) proposing alternative sources of constitutional protection for nonpolitical
speech. The first approach, although useful to some extent,
cannot fully address the autonomy concern without undermining the method and purpose of the public rights theory. Past attempts at the second approach have lacked force or coherence
and have failed to embody the affirmative reasons why people
favor constitutional protection of much nonpolitical speech.
That second approach, however, points toward the newly viable
substantive due process solution proposed in Part II.
1. Expanding the Category of Political Speech
When a categorical method of distributing some benefit
loses support because it excludes popular or sympathetic beneficiaries, a straightforward solution is available: expand the
category. In party politics this is known as the “big tent” approach;141 in the public policy arena, inclusion of a vast range of
middle-income beneficiaries in order to sell the Social Security
Act in the 1930s illustrates the same principle.142 In the First
Amendment context, the more speech that falls within a theory’s privileged category of political speech, the broader the theory’s appeal.
The most important example of this approach in the public
rights tradition is Meiklejohn’s treatment of artistic expression.
Art appears to lie outside the range of Meiklejohn’s First
Amendment; at a minimum, his disdain for entertainment meclosest thing to an existing constitutional model for the extension of substantive due process that this Article advocates.
141. See, e.g., KENNETH S. BAER, REINVENTING DEMOCRATS 120–21 (2000)
(describing the Democratic Party’s attempt to maintain an ideologically wide
range of elected officials as a “Big Tent” approach). For a brief account of major political parties’ tendency to moderate policy positions by building broadbased coalitions, see Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 2, at 1961–62.
142. See DANIEL NELSON, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 205 (1969) (explaining that securing political approval of the Social Security Act required ensuring that the Act would benefit a broad group of constituencies).
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dia suggests a refusal to attribute political value to artistic expression.143 However, in a later elaboration of his theory, Meiklejohn acknowledges that a “vast array of idea and fact, of science and fiction, of poetry and prose, of belief and doubt, of
appreciation and purpose, of information and argument” legitimately contributes to citizens’ decisions about matters of
public policy and thus warrants First Amendment protection.144
Struggles with the conceptual limits of the public rights theory’s coverage can generate important, constructive refinements. Much artistic expression reflects political convictions
and/or informs political debate, and further examination of the
boundaries between political and nonpolitical speech will yield
comparably sound insights about the political essence of other
nominally nonpolitical expression.145
As a strategy for making the public rights theory more palatable, however, expanding the category of political speech contains a fatal flaw. To whatever extent we broaden the class of
protected speech, we simultaneously weaken the categorical
methodology that defines the public rights theory. As Meiklejohn emphasizes, the First Amendment “remains forever confused and unintelligible unless we draw sharply and clearly the
line which separates the public welfare of the community from
the private goods of any individual citizen or group of citizens.”146 If we really believe, and can explain persuasively, that
a given type of expression has political character, then admitting that expression to the scope of First Amendment protection genuinely serves the interest in ensuring robust political
debate. But we cannot reasonably hope that the categorical
boundary of political expression extends to, or past, the point
necessary to allay a critical mass of concerns about the theory’s
costs. Comprehensively reconciling the theory’s scope with
autonomy values by expanding the category of protected expression would inevitably require either conceptual gerrymandering or elision of any categorical boundary. Such compromise
would fatally undermine the goal of deep protection for political

143. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 79–80 (discussing private speech
generally). This disdain appears especially vivid in Meiklejohn’s savage attack
on commercial radio. See id. at 86–88.
144. Id. at 117.
145. See supra notes 118–27 and accompanying text (discussing the value
of the ongoing dispute about the boundaries of politics).
146. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 79–80.
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speech, increasing pressure toward retaining a balancing approach that reduces political expression to the same stature as
speech less integral to a healthy democracy.
2. Finding Alternative Constitutional Protection for
Nonpolitical Speech
The failure of attempts to improve the public rights theory
by expanding the category of political expression demonstrates
that any effort to cure the theory’s coverage deficit must maintain a conceptual distinction between political and nonpolitical
speech. The surest way to protect different categories of expression while keeping them separate is to assign different constitutional statuses to the respective categories. Leading public
rights theorists, not surprisingly, have tried to do exactly that.
Their ingenious efforts, while ultimately unsuccessful, provide
a template for a more effective solution.
Meiklejohn’s initial statement of the public rights theory
appears to acknowledge the strategic risk of leaving substantial
categories of speech unprotected. Even as he advocates limiting
the scope of First Amendment protection to political speech and
denigrates the importance of what he calls “private” speech,
Meiklejohn offers an olive branch. Nonpolitical, “private”
speech, while not entitled to the ironclad protection of the First
Amendment, should still get constitutional protection as an aspect of the “liberty” secured by the procedural due process principles of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.147 In other
words, the government should enjoy discretion to restrict or
punish nonpolitical speech, but not without offering notice and
the possibility of a hearing. This approach, Meiklejohn argues,
properly treats nonpolitical speech like ordinary conduct, reflecting the insight that the First Amendment elevates political
speech to a special position.148 From a contemporary, strategic
perspective, however, Meiklejohn’s treatment of nonpolitical
speech amounts to dooming with faint protection. No one who
disdains the public rights theory for its failure to protect a substantial amount of nonpolitical speech will warm to the theory
upon assurance that the censor’s iron fist comes sheathed in a
procedural velvet glove.
Sunstein’s version of alternative constitutional protection
for nonpolitical speech appears, upon first glance, far more
147. See id.
148. See id. at 80.
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promising. In one of two alternative proposals for revising free
speech doctrine, he advocates a “two-tiered” First Amendment.149 Under this approach, the First Amendment would
fully protect political speech; on the other hand, nonpolitical
speech would get weaker First Amendment protection that
would yield more readily to countervailing government interests.150 Sunstein justifies this approach by maintaining that the
Court already accords special protection to political speech
while denying or limiting First Amendment protection as to
several categories of nonpolitical expression: obscenity, commercial speech, and libel of private persons.151 Moreover, he
notes, the Court treats numerous other instances of nonpolitical speech—conspiracies, purely verbal workplace harassment,
bribery, and threats—as if they are not speech at all for First
Amendment purposes.152 Given these existing doctrines, Sunstein argues, an explicit shift to a two-tiered First Amendment
would merely ratify our active intuitions about the need to
treat different categories of speech differently.
Although Sunstein appears to offer greater assurances to
skeptics of the public rights theory who fear for the safety of
nonpolitical speech, those assurances ultimately lack substance. First, nothing in the text, structure, or history of the
Constitution provides a basis for bifurcating the First Amendment. Unlike Meiklejohn’s elaboration of the public rights theory, which anticipates and addresses originalist and textualist
critiques,153 Sunstein’s two-tiered First Amendment is nothing
more than a convenient invention. In relying on the claim that
the Court has already moved toward a two-tiered First
Amendment, Sunstein makes the mistake of building a doctrine

149. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 301–15 (arguing for “primacy of politics” in First Amendment theory). Sunstein’s alternative proposal, which he
calls “a New Deal for speech,” emphasizes the politically determined nature of
expressive opportunities and advocates government regulation to improve the
flow of ideas. See id. at 263–300. The public rights theory of expressive freedom contains elements in common with each of Sunstein’s approaches. See supra notes 14–27 and accompanying text (describing the public rights theory).
150. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 306 (arguing that “government should
be under a special burden of justification when it seeks to control speech intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation”).
151. See id. at 302.
152. See id.
153. See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 2, at 1972 (describing the textual genesis of Meiklejohn’s First Amendment theory as the paradox of the
First Amendment’s absolutist language but necessarily limited effect).
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on disparate rules that he concedes lack a “clear principle.”154
In addition, the argument from existing practice contradicts
Sunstein’s own normative precept for advocating change in
First Amendment theory: that the Court is insufficiently protecting political speech while overprotecting less deserving
categories of expression.155 Second, and accordingly, the substance of Sunstein’s two-tiered First Amendment derives from
nothing more than his own normative priorities: the objection
to giving such unworthies as stock prospectuses, pornography,
1-900 numbers, large political expenditures, and network television programs First Amendment pride of place.156 Sunstein’s
bifurcation of the First Amendment creates a structural facade
for his subjective preferences.
Beyond these problems, Meiklejohn’s and Sunstein’s attempts to relocate protection for nonpolitical speech share a final, essential flaw. Neither approach addresses the basic source
of discomfort with the public rights theory: that the Constitution should protect nonpolitical speech as a matter of right because people should be entitled to speak as their autonomous
choices dictate.157 This flaw follows naturally from each theorist’s open rejection of autonomy as a justification for protecting
speech. Meiklejohn sharply criticizes “an American Individualism whose excesses have weakened and riddled our understanding of the meaning of intellectual freedom.”158 Accordingly, his procedural due process approach manifestly treats
nonpolitical speech like ordinary, unprivileged behavior and
merely acknowledges the procedural limits the Constitution
places on every government regulation. Sunstein maintains
that “an approach rooted in the norm of autonomy makes it difficult to understand what is special about speech.”159 Accordingly, although he formally treats nonpolitical speech as a matter of right, he too fails to offer any affirmative explanation
why nonpolitical speech deserves constitutional protection.
Both Meiklejohn and Sunstein rhetorically diminish speech

154. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 302.
155. See id. at 258 (contrasting early First Amendment decisions that protected political dissenters’ rights with contemporary decisions that protect the
rights of various private and corporate interests).
156. See id.
157. See supra Part I.B.2.
158. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 72.
159. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 304.
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whose primary value goes to personal autonomy, treating such
speech as a second-class constitutional citizen that can only try
to squeeze under the edge of the protective umbrella that
shields political speech.
These defects in previous attempts to locate alternative
constitutional protection for nonpolitical speech appear inevitable because, until recently, nothing in constitutional doctrine
suggested any affirmative basis for meaningfully protecting
nonpolitical expression without resort to a private rights account of the First Amendment. In 2003, however, the Supreme
Court provided an opening for a robust alternative source of
constitutional protection for nonpolitical expression: substantive due process. Understanding how substantive due process
doctrine can accommodate nonpolitical speech protection requires an examination of how the Supreme Court’s most recent
statement on substantive due process departs from previous
law.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS SOLUTION TO THE
NONPOLITICAL SPEECH PROBLEM
The substantive element of the Fifth160 and Fourteenth
Amendments’ Due Process Clauses161 has provided the most
important constitutional opportunity for the Supreme Court to
adjust the uneasy balance between majoritarian preferences, as
expressed in legislative choices, and deeply rooted minority interests.162 Although substantive due process doctrine lacks a
straightforward foundation in the constitutional text, its resilience over time testifies to our legal system’s deeply rooted in-

160. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
161. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. Substantive due process doctrine
has developed primarily under the Fourteenth Amendment, which by its
terms applies only to the states. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166
(1973) (striking down a state’s restrictions on abortion under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause). The Supreme Court has extended substantive due process principles to the federal government through the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–
02 (1993) (noting the availability of a substantive due process claim under the
Fifth Amendment).
162. The substantive due process doctrine has generated an enormous body
of scholarship. For a useful recent discussion and taxonomy, see Peter J.
Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural
Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 841–49 (2003)
(emphasizing distinctions among the strands of substantive due process doctrine).
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sight that a constitutional culture of individual rights must accommodate substantive protections of essential human activities. Even as the doctrine has taken root, however, the Supreme Court has made clear that the potentially sweeping
character and necessarily uncertain judicial explication of substantive due process163 require judges to balance the importance for individuals of protected conduct against significant
government grounds for regulating that conduct.164 Thus, the
twin challenges of substantive due process jurisprudence have
been to articulate a theoretical basis for unenumerated substantive rights and to identify the nature of government interests that can properly trump those rights.
The Court’s most recent substantive due process decision,
Lawrence v. Texas,165 takes up both of those challenges, providing important guidelines for the further development of substantive due process. Lawrence earned its landmark status by
striking down all state restrictions on “sodomy” between consenting adults as violations of substantive due process.166 The
Court held that the Constitution precluded state efforts “to define the meaning of [a personal] relationship or to set its
boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution
the law protects.”167 Two pillars of the Lawrence majority’s reasoning portend sweeping changes beyond the scope of sodomy

163. The great cautionary tale of substantive due process, of course, is the
Court’s wholesale usurpation of the elected branches’ regulatory prerogatives
through the economic substantive due process doctrine of the Lochner era.
Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (asserting broad judicial
power to protect a laissez-faire right to contract against government regulation), with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 538–39 (1934) (essentially disavowing the Lochner doctrine as improperly invasive of majoritarian prerogatives).
164. The Court initially implemented this balance, in cases of “fundamental rights,” through strict scrutiny. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155–56 (subjecting
state restrictions on access to abortion to strict scrutiny). More recently in the
abortion context, the Court has adjusted the balance in the government’s favor
by replacing strict scrutiny with an inquiry into whether the challenged government action places an “undue burden” on the abortion right. See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(replacing strict scrutiny with an undue burden standard). To date, the Court
has not applied the undue burden standard in any other substantive due process context.
165. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
166. See id. at 578–79.
167. Id. at 567.
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laws or even regulations of sexual behavior generally. First, as
to the basis of substantive due process rights, the Court articulated an expansive theory of personal autonomy as the essential value that substantive due process safeguards.168 Second,
as to the nature of superseding government interests, the Court
discredited government restrictions on protected conduct that
derive from purely moral justifications unrelated to potential
harms to unwilling third parties.169
These two principles of Lawrence have great salience for a
problem that no one has previously associated with substantive
due process: the Constitution’s protection of nonpolitical
speech.170 Lawrence affords the Court an opportunity to transplant constitutional speech protection directed at preserving
personal autonomy, rather than collective political decision
making, from the First Amendment to the Due Process Clause.
Such a shift would satisfy our deep convictions about the importance of preserving a constitutional safeguard for all expression that advances personal autonomy. It would also create a
more coherent basis for assessing the social trade-offs at stake
in government regulation of nonpolitical speech. At the same
time, it would enable the Court, consistent with the public
rights theory, to preserve the First Amendment’s Free Speech
Clause as a virtually absolute shield against regulations that
undermine politically salient expression.

168. See infra Part II.A.1.
169. See infra Part II.A.2.
170. Other accounts of Lawrence have noted in passing that the Court’s
sense of substantive due process resonates with First Amendment rhetoric.
See Wilson Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution: Unlocking Human Potential in Grutter and Lawrence, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 65, 78 (2003) (suggesting that Lawrence makes substantive due process more like First Amendment speech protection by transforming it into “a subjective, abstract
principle”); Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103,
1107 (2004) (describing “associational freedom” as a predicate for “identity
formation” within the realm of substantive due process); Tribe, supra note 124,
at 1932 (noting the similarity between Lawrence’s analysis and the First
Amendment’s prohibition on certain grounds for government regulation). In
addition, of course, the Due Process Clause has long protected a great deal of
speech through its incorporation of the First Amendment’s protections. See
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding that “freedom of speech
and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States”); Rubin, supra note 162, at 842 (discussing incorporation as a species of substantive due process doctrine).

MAGARIAN_3FMT

284

12/22/2005 10:55:40 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:247

A. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND THE NEW DAWN OF SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS PROTECTION
Prior to Lawrence, the Supreme Court’s enthusiasm for
protecting substantive rights under the Due Process Clause
appeared marginal at best. Substantive due process doctrine
had reached its recent high water marks in the Court’s tepid
reaffirmation of the right to abortion in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey171 and indications from a
splintered majority of Justices in Washington v. Glucksberg
that the Due Process Clause might, in extreme circumstances,
support a right to physician-assisted suicide.172 But the Court
had declined invitations to extend the substantive due process
principle to new rights after Roe v. Wade,173 harshly rejecting
claims for due process rights to parental visitation in Michael
H. v. Gerald D.,174 to sexual autonomy in Bowers v. Hardwick,175 and to a right to die with dignity in Glucksberg.176
171. 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986) (striking down provisions of a
state’s abortion law because “they wholly subordinate constitutional privacy
interests and concerns with maternal health in an effort to deter a woman
from making a decision that, with her physician, is hers to make”), overruled
in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at 870, 882–83.
172. See 521 U.S. 702, 736 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (leaving open
the question of “whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing
great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death”); id. at 738 (Stevens, J., concurring
in the judgments) (finding “room for further debate about the limits that the
Constitution places on the power of the States to punish” physician-assisted
suicide); id. at 782 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgments) (stating that “the
importance of the individual interest here, as within that class of ‘certain interests’ demanding careful scrutiny of the State’s contrary claim cannot be
gainsaid” but reserving judgment on the question “[w]hether that interest
might in some circumstances, or at some time, be seen as ‘fundamental’ to the
degree entitled to prevail”) (citation omitted). Justices Breyer and Ginsburg
joined Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in substance. See id. at 736; see also
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (upholding a
state court decision that required a family’s discontinuation of a daughter’s
life-sustaining treatment to be supported by clear and convincing evidence of
her wishes).
173. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (recognizing women’s reproductive freedom
as part of the privacy rights inherent in due process).
174. 491 U.S. 110, 124–27 (1989) (rejecting a biological father’s claimed
right to visit his child, who was in the custody of the child’s biological mother
and adoptive father).
175. 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (rejecting the argument that the Due Process
Clause conferred a fundamental right to engage in consensual gay sex), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
176. 521 U.S. at 728.
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Lawrence dramatically shifted the tide, reinvigorating substantive due process both by sharpening the doctrine’s affirmative
rationale and by tightening the restrictions it imposes on government regulation.
1. Substantive Due Process as a Guarantor of Personal
Autonomy
First, Justice Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion makes the
Court’s strongest statement to date on the roots of substantive
due process doctrine in the personal right to live and behave
autonomously.177 The idea that substantive due process protects individuals’ right to make autonomous decisions about
matters central to their lives and identities is hardly novel. Beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court rooted modern,
noneconomic substantive due process in personal privacy,178 a
concept closely related to autonomy. Griswold linked substantive due process protection to the marital relationship,179 but
Justice Brennan, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,180 moved toward an
individualized notion of personal autonomy. “If the right of privacy means anything,” he wrote for the Court, “it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affect-

177. The Lawrence Court’s concept of individual autonomy integrates
strong concerns with both relative equality of treatment and interactions
among different people and groups. See Hunter, supra note 170, at 1134 (arguing that Lawrence reflects “an appreciation of the mutual reinforcement of
equality and liberty principles”); David D. Meyer, Domesticating Lawrence,
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 453, 480–85 (casting Lawrence as a “family privacy”
decision); Schacter, supra note 124, at 749–51 (suggesting that Lawrence combines notions of liberty and equality with special emphasis on interpersonal
relationships); Tribe, supra note 124, at 1898 (arguing that Lawrence “both
presupposed and advanced an explicitly equality-based and relationallysituated theory of substantive liberty”).
178. See 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (“The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”).
179. See id. at 485–86 (basing the Court’s decision to strike down a state
contraceptive ban on “notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship”). In emphasizing the family relationship, the Griswold Court followed
the pattern of two cases from the 1920s, often cited as precursors of noneconomic substantive due process, in which the Court struck down restrictions
on parents’ decisions about how to educate their children. See Pierce v. Soc’y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401
(1923).
180. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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ing a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”181
The seeds of personal autonomy in Eisenstadt bore doctrinal
fruit when the Court, in Roe v. Wade, affirmed women’s due
process right to receive abortions.182 The Roe Court appeared to
embrace the idea that the Due Process Clause protected people’s right to make intimately personal decisions without government interference.183
Eisenstadt, however, came to represent a road not taken.
Beginning with its emphatic approval in Bowers v. Hardwick of
state prohibitions on sodomy, the Court appeared to abandon
the idea that substantive due process embodies broad constitutional protection for personal autonomy.184 The key substantive
due process decisions that followed Bowers neither recanted its
restrictive reasoning nor offered much hope that the Court
would restore a robust concept of personal autonomy to the center of due process jurisprudence. In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
Justice Scalia’s opinion upholding a state presumption of legitimacy for children born in wedlock disdained any broad notion of liberty in favor of deference to traditions of state law.185
Although the declaration of the plurality in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey that “the heart of
liberty” harbored “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life”186 anticipated Lawrence rhetorically, the rhetoric rang hollow as the Casey plurality permitted states to restrict abortion

181. Id. at 453.
182. 410 U.S. 113, 164–67 (1973).
183. See id. at 152–53; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S.
678, 684–86, 699 (1977) (plurality opinion) (invoking the Due Process Clause
to strike down a state statute that banned the sale of contraceptives to minors).
184. 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (complaining that “despite the language of
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which appears to focus only on the processes by which life, liberty, or property is taken,
the cases are legion in which those Clauses have been interpreted to have substantive content” and declaring that many of the Court’s noneconomic substantive due process decisions “have little or no textual support in the constitutional language”), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
185. See 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989) (“What counts is whether the States in
fact award substantive parental rights to the natural father of a child conceived within, and born into, an extant marital union that wishes to embrace
the child. We are not aware of a single case, old or new, that has done so. This
is not the stuff of which fundamental rights qualifying as liberty interests are
made.”).
186. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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rights through enforced waiting periods accompanied by mandatory information designed to discourage abortions187 and parental consent schemes for minors who sought abortions.188
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Washington
v. Glucksberg came close to disdaining substantive due process
altogether, emphasizing the supposed analytic perils of extending the doctrine and reiterating the Michael H. conception of
tradition-bound due process jurisprudence.189
Lawrence revitalizes the Eisenstadt idea of personal autonomy and makes it the basis of a momentous decision that boldly
overrules Bowers and enshrines in constitutional law the sexual freedom of gay men and lesbians. Justice Kennedy begins
his Lawrence analysis by defining liberty, the central value in
substantive due process doctrine,190 in terms of autonomy:
“Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”191
The majority rejects the proposition that substantive due process protection requires a specific basis in tradition.192 In apprehending the issue before the Court, Justice Kennedy rebukes
the view of Bowers that sodomy laws merely implicate “the
right to engage in certain sexual conduct.”193 That formulation
of the question, Justice Kennedy insists, trivializes the interest
of people subject to liability for violating sodomy prohibitions.194 He posits a much broader interest at stake in substantive due process challenges to state restrictions on intimate behavior: “the autonomy of the person” in making “personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, fam-

187. See id. at 882 (upholding against due process challenge Pennsylvania’s “informed consent” requirement for abortions).
188. See id. at 899 (upholding against due process challenge Pennsylvania’s parental consent requirement for minors who seek abortions).
189. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (“We must
therefore exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new
ground in this field, lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be
subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court.”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
190. See Hunter, supra note 170, at 1106–07 (suggesting that Lawrence replaces privacy with liberty as the principle behind substantive due process).
191. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
192. See id. at 571. The majority leaves dissenting Justice Scalia to wave
the faded flag of his tradition-specific approach. See id. at 592–93 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
193. Id. at 567 (majority opinion).
194. See id.
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ily relationships, child rearing, and education.”195 A restriction
on the sexual practices of consenting adults represents an effort
by the state to “demean their existence [and] control their destiny.”196 For the Lawrence Court, substantive due process protects not a mere descriptive activity but rather a normative
value—that of personal autonomy.
2. The Inadequacy of Purely Moral Justifications for Limits on
Personal Autonomy
A second defining feature of Lawrence is the Court’s willingness to embrace a logical implication of noneconomic substantive due process doctrine that it previously avoided: government may not restrict or punish personal decisions based
purely on moral disapproval.197 The Court’s rejection of the essentially moral regulations in Griswold,198 Eisenstadt,199 and
Roe200 appeared to reflect an understanding that a state’s imposing its moral judgments on individuals’ intimate personal
decisions effectively negates personal autonomy. Subsequent
decisions, however, gave substantial deference to states’ purely
moral grounds for limiting personal autonomy. The Bowers
Court insisted that “the law . . . is constantly based on notions

195. Id. at 574.
196. Id. at 578.
197. Commentators have noted this feature of Lawrence. See Huhn, supra
note 170, at 90–92; Hunter, supra note 170, at 1112; Schacter, supra note 124,
at 740. But see Andrew Koppelman, Lawrence’s Penumbra, 88 MINN. L. REV.
1171, 1175–76 (2004) (arguing that the Lawrence Court simply found the
state’s moral interest insufficient to outweigh the liberty interest at stake).
Professor Tribe argues that the rejection of moral regulation in Lawrence extends only to regulations that burden associational rights. See Tribe, supra
note 124, at 1935–36. The basis and scope of that asserted limit, however, remain unclear. Another potential limit on the decision’s rejection of moral regulation stems from the fact that the sodomy statutes at issue in Lawrence carried criminal penalties. Nothing in the opinion, however, limits the Court’s
reasoning to criminal regulations, and Lawrence seems highly salient for noncriminal regulations that seriously burden personal autonomy.
198. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (“[I]t is clear that the state interest in safeguarding marital fidelity can be served by a more discriminately tailored statute, which does not,
like the present one, sweep unnecessarily broadly . . . .”).
199. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972) (rejecting “deterrence of premarital sex” as a reasonable justification for a law that banned
giving contraceptives to unmarried persons).
200. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (“[W]e do not agree that, by
adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant
woman that are at stake.”).
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of morality” and practically ridiculed the notion of due process
scrutiny for “all laws representing essentially moral choices.”201
The Casey plurality predicated its revision of the Roe abortion
right on heightened solicitude for the government’s interest in
“protection of potential life.”202 In particular, the plurality compromised its emphasis on pregnant women’s decisional autonomy in deference to “the spouse, family, and society which must
confront the knowledge that [abortion] procedures exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an act of violence against innocent human life.”203 Although the plurality included this interest among “consequences” of abortion,204 it made no effort to
explain how purely moral disapproval of the procedure could
carry anything more than a purely moral consequence. Likewise, the Glucksberg Court counted among the “important and
legitimate” government interests that justified state bans on
physician-assisted suicide the “symbolic and aspirational as
well as practical” desire to preserve human life.205
Lawrence reverses the tendency to approve purely moral
regulations by adopting perhaps the farthest-reaching language from Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Bowers:
“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”206 Justice
Kennedy underscores the rejection of purely moral regulation
in his justification for overruling Bowers. Contrasting that departure from stare decisis with the Court’s adherence to precedent in Casey,207 he explains that “there has been no individual
201. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 578.
202. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992). Of
course, the question whether the government’s interest in protecting potential
life implicates harm to a third party defines the philosophical frontiers of the
abortion debate. However, a Court committed to prohibiting purely moral
regulation would have needed, at a minimum, to acknowledge its inability to
resolve that question.
203. Id. at 852.
204. Id.
205. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728–29 (1997) (plurality
opinion) (describing the state’s “unqualified interest in the preservation of
human life” (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282
(1990))); see also id. at 746 (Stevens, J., concurring) (recognizing the government interest in the “sanctity of life”).
206. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens,
J., dissenting)).
207. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 860–61 (explaining the importance of adhering
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or societal reliance on Bowers of the sort that could counsel
against overturning its holding once there are compelling reasons to do so.”208 However, as Justice Scalia correctly points out
in dissent, many people relied extensively on Bowers if one
treats “a governing majority’s belief that certain sexual behavior is ‘immoral and unacceptable’” as a cognizable basis for a reliance interest.209 Justice Kennedy also contrasts the consensual activity that sodomy prohibitions restrict with conduct
that involves “minors” or “persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might
not easily be refused” and with “public conduct or prostitution.”210 Those distinctions imply that the state legitimately
may restrict personal autonomy only where the autonomous
decision or conduct at issue harm third parties or the public.211
Justice Scalia casts the majority’s distinctions into even
sharper relief by insisting that Lawrence undermines all state
prohibitions of “bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity” because such prohibitions are “sustainable only in light
of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices.”212
The Lawrence majority’s rejection of purely moral justifications for state restrictions on important decisions situates the
Court in a long and distinguished line of critics of moral regulation. In John Stuart Mill’s famous formulation, “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent

to precedent in the abortion context).
208. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
209. Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196).
210. Id. at 578 (majority opinion).
211. Justice O’Connor’s opinion concurring in the judgment in Lawrence,
which relies on the narrower ground of the Equal Protection Clause, echoes
the majority’s criticism of purely moral regulation in the context of legal distinctions among groups of people. For Justice O’Connor, “[m]oral disapproval
of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be ‘drawn for the purpose
of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.’” Id. at 583 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633
(1996)).
212. Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 599 (repeating the
charge). Wilson Huhn makes the interesting observation that Justice Scalia
and the Court display clashing visions of morality, with Justice Scalia insisting on mandatory rules where the majority views decisional autonomy as a
predicate for morally viable personal choices. See Huhn, supra note 170, at 91–
93.
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harm to others.”213 This “harm principle” is a familiar, and
much debated, idea in liberal democratic theory.214 In the substantive due process context, the principle mandates that only
the potential for harm to unwilling third parties can justify restraints on intimate personal decisions.215 Justice Kennedy in
Lawrence holds that due process bars “attempts by the State, or
a court, to define the meaning of [a personal] relationship or to
set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects.”216 Acknowledging the moral basis for
the Bowers decision, he specifically rejects the idea that “the
majority may use the power of the State to enforce [moral]
views on the whole society through operation of the criminal
law.”217 This understanding departs dramatically not only from
Bowers but also from Casey and Glucksberg.218 The Lawrence
majority’s embrace of the harm principle follows naturally from
its positive emphasis on personal autonomy. If the Constitution
protects people’s prerogatives to live their lives as they see fit,
then government interference with an individual’s decisions
about matters central to personal autonomy can only be just if
necessary to protect some other person’s concrete interest.

213. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Alburey Castell ed., AppletonCentury-Crofts, Inc. 1947) (1859).
214. The classic exchange in the past half-century about the legitimacy of
purely moral justifications for constraints on autonomy is the Hart-Devlin debate. Compare H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963) (advocating
the harm principle), with PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS
(1975) (defending morality-based regulation).
215. David Meyer argues that reading Lawrence as having embraced the
harm principle threatens to undermine the ways in which moral conceptions of
family relationships have contributed to socially beneficial family relationships. See Meyer, supra note 177, at 477. Although Meyer identifies values
worth protecting, his concern rests on an unduly positive presumption about
the effects of majoritarian morality on human flourishing; overestimates the
ability of substantive due process doctrine to constrain affirmative government
initiatives designed to accomplish social policy goals, such as spending programs and public information campaigns; and underestimates the scope of legally cognizable harm under the harm principle.
216. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. Justice Kennedy notes that “19th-century
sodomy prosecutions typically involved relations between men and minor girls
or minor boys, relations between adults involving force, relations between
adults implicating disparity in status, or relations between men and animals.”
Id. at 569. In contrast, “[t]he present case does not involve minors. It does not
involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public
conduct or prostitution.” Id. at 578.
217. Id. at 571.
218. See supra notes 201–05 and accompanying text.
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B. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND NONPOLITICAL SPEECH
The Court’s reasoning in Lawrence enables a fundamental
revision of constitutional free speech doctrine. The Lawrence
account of substantive due process does not merely echo the
private rights theory’s call to protect speech in the name of personal autonomy;219 rather, Lawrence gives that imperative a
more comfortable home in substantive due process than it presently enjoys in the First Amendment. The Court should take
this opportunity to shift the basis for constitutional protection
of speech whose primary value goes to personal autonomy from
the First Amendment to the Due Process Clause.220 Under this
approach, the Court in nonpolitical speech cases would balance
the value of the burdened speech for some person’s or persons’
autonomy against the concrete harm the speech threatened to
third parties. Complementing that change, the Court should
limit the scope of First Amendment expressive freedom to
speech whose primary value goes to political discourse.
These two doctrinal moves would bring several related
benefits. Judicial analysis of nonpolitical speech regulations
would gain coherence and force through explicit focus on the
personal autonomy value of speech claims and the credibility of
government submissions about harm from expression. Nonpolitical speech would enjoy substantial constitutional protection,
with the strongest protection attaching to the speech claims
that most forcefully served the societal consensus to protect
personal autonomy. Meanwhile, political speech would gain the
deep First Amendment protection that Meiklejohn envisioned,

219. See supra notes 2–6 (discussing the private rights theory’s emphasis
on personal autonomy as a basis for constitutional protection of speech).
220. One practical concern about this shift is that the Court only recently
decided Lawrence, and nonpolitical speech protection is too important to be
predicated on a freshly minted precedent in a volatile area of law. Following
this Article’s prescription, however, should diminish the likelihood that a later
Court would undermine Lawrence, both because my proposal would expand
the practical scope of substantive due process and because the proposal rests
on an account of Lawrence that should firmly ground the decision as precedent. Even if the Court did adopt my proposal and then, at some later time,
weaken or abandon Lawrence, it presumably would restore nonpolitical speech
protection to the First Amendment, because such a retrenchment would represent, among other things, a rejection of this Article’s case for treating nonpolitical speech as a matter of substantive due process rather than a First
Amendment concern. In addition, as I discuss infra Part III, present First
Amendment protection for nonpolitical speech is hardly so ironclad or firmly
grounded as to render my proposal inordinately risky by comparison.
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free from the balancing against government regulatory interests appropriate for speech claims less salient to our Constitution’s central democratic aspirations.221
The two key features of the Lawrence opinion discussed in
the previous section—emphasis on personal autonomy as the
driving force behind substantive due process and rejection of
purely moral regulation in favor of the harm principle—make
the Due Process Clause a viable source of constitutional protection for nonpolitical speech.
First, the Lawrence Court’s emphasis on personal autonomy’s centrality to constitutional rights resonates strongly with
the private rights theory of expressive freedom and thus with
much contemporary free speech doctrine. Under the private
rights theory, the Constitution ensures expressive freedom because expression is an essential vehicle through which individuals advance their interests, and government interference
with expression accordingly cuts to the heart of personal
autonomy. Substantive due process, as conceptualized in Lawrence, deepens and elaborates on that understanding, expanding it to encompass all manner of self-actualizing behavior.
Moreover, the idea of autonomy revived and strengthened in
Lawrence reflects particular concern with personal freedom to
conduct intimate interpersonal relationships, a concern that
parallels the necessary emphasis of speech protection on communication and association between and among people.222
Prior to Lawrence, the Court’s tentative, contingent linkage
of personal autonomy with substantive due process was too
weak to provide a bridge between due process and free speech
doctrines.223 In contrast, the Lawrence Court’s account of personal autonomy’s centrality to substantive due process echoes
and sharpens the reasoning of decisions that protect expression
because of its autonomy value. Just as Lawrence emphasizes
“an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct,”224 the Court’s free
speech jurisprudence emphasizes the contribution speech
221. See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text (discussing the public
rights theory’s advocacy of categorical protection, rather than balancing, for
political speech).
222. See Tribe, supra note 124, at 1939–40 (identifying “speech and the
peaceful commingling of separate selves [as] facets of the eternal quest for . . .
exchanging emotions, values, and ideas”).
223. See supra notes 184–89 and accompanying text.
224. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
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makes to personal autonomy.225 Justice Kennedy’s libertarian
rhetoric in Lawrence echoes his First Amendment opinions,
which strongly reflect the private rights theory of expressive
freedom.226 Justice Kennedy has even noted affinities between
substantive due process and the autonomy concerns that undergird the private rights theory of expressive freedom, suggesting that early twentieth-century due process decisions that
protect parents’ decisions about child-rearing, “had they been
decided in recent times, may well have been grounded upon
First Amendment principles.”227
Second, the Lawrence Court’s embrace of the harm principle closely parallels free speech doctrine’s emphasis on the impermissibility of regulation. Disdain for purely moral regulation features prominently in First Amendment doctrine,
generating free speech law’s core directive against regulations
of expression that reflect the government’s normative disapproval of the speaker’s ideas.228 Judges and scholars who disagree about other elements of First Amendment theory generally agree that the worst affront to expressive freedom is
regulation that censors or punishes a particular viewpoint.229
The Supreme Court’s rejection of viewpoint-based regulation
even within the boundaries of speech unprotected by the First
225. See supra notes 2–13 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)
(Kennedy, J.) (“At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that
each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving
of expression, consideration, and adherence.”).
227. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 95 (2000) (discussing Pierce v. Soc’y
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (plurality opinion), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923)).
228. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
828–29 (1995) (“It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech
based on its substantive content or the message it conveys . . . . Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.”); Members of
the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (“The general principle . . . is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.”); Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”).
229. Compare MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 26 (positing as “the vital
point” of free speech theory “that no suggestion of policy shall be denied a
hearing because it is on one side of the issue rather than another”), with Fried,
supra note 131, at 225 (“Government may not suppress or regulate speech because it does not like its content . . . . If government regulates the time, place
or manner of speech, it must regulate in a way that does not take sides between competing ideas.”).
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Amendment indicates the fundamental incompatibility of constitutional speech protection with majoritarian judgments
about the quality of competing ideas.230 Whereas prohibiting
purely moral regulation marks a bold step for regulations of
sexual behavior, that prohibition already pervades the law applied to restrictions on speech and expressive conduct.
Prior to Lawrence, the Court’s substantive due process doctrine too easily tolerated purely moral regulation, precluding a
bridge between due process and free speech principles.231 Invoking substantive due process as a ground for protecting expression would have permitted many government regulations
of speech based on majoritarian preferences, a notion intolerable to First Amendment doctrine. But the Lawrence Court’s
account of permissible grounds for regulation, like its autonomy-based justification of due process rights, harmonizes substantive due process doctrine with familiar principles of expressive freedom.232 The harm principle of Lawrence replicates the
most substantial reason for limiting speech protection in some
instances: that the speech in question will cause concrete
harm.233 One of the public rights theory’s core principles is that

230. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (accepting the
assumption that a municipal ordinance prohibiting the display of objects intended to arouse anger or alarm restricted only unprotected “fighting words”
but nonetheless striking down the ordinance under the First Amendment). For
a discussion of R.A.V. as an exemplar of rights doctrines’ focus on preventing
improperly motivated regulations, see Tribe, supra note 124, at 1932–33. See
also Hunter, supra note 170, at 1115–16 (noting the Lawrence Court’s emphasis on the legitimacy of the government’s ground for regulation).
231. See supra notes 201–05 and accompanying text.
232. Professor Baker advances a distinctively robust autonomy-centered
theory of expressive freedom, arguing that harm should not justify regulation
of speech because the autonomy values he views as justifying speech protection supersede society’s interest in preventing harm. See Baker, supra note
129, at 992. Baker’s argument appears to depend on the idea that speech is a
distinctive exercise of “liberty,” a notion that further depends on his conception of speech as operating nonviolently and noncoercively. See id. at 986 (defining protected expression). Baker fails to distinguish speech from action that
similarly advances liberty without resort to coercion and violence or, in the
alternative, to sufficiently distinguish “harmful” effects of speech from coercive
or violent effects. Thomas Scanlon parses the appropriate role of harm in
speech regulation more persuasively. See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 209–22 (1972). He distinguishes
regulations that seek to prevent persuasion to do harm, which Scanlon’s free
speech theory presumptively would bar, from regulations that seek to prevent
speech that materially assists in the commission of harmful acts, which Scanlon presumptively would allow. See id.
233. The harm principle stands behind most of the Supreme Court’s exclu-
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fear of harm has no salience in political speech cases, except in
circumstances where the speech at issue threatens to render
debate itself impossible.234 Lawrence allows that principle to
stand under the First Amendment while providing a sensible
guideline for balancing in nonpolitical speech cases.
Enlisting substantive due process to protect nonpolitical
speech would improve upon present free speech doctrine by
employing a different, more theoretically coherent constitutional principle to trigger searching judicial review of burdens
on speech that primarily advances personal autonomy rather
than political discourse. Under present First Amendment doctrine, which encompasses political and nonpolitical speech, a
court will subject a regulation to heightened scrutiny simply
because the regulation targets or burdens an activity classified
as expressive. In contrast, a Lawrence-derived substantive due
process shield for nonpolitical speech would subject a regulation of such speech to searching judicial review because the
speech advanced personal autonomy. This linkage does not imply that all expression is entitled to substantive due process
protection, nor does it obscure the Court’s established commitment to protecting various kinds of nonexpressive conduct under the Due Process Clause.235 Rather, in light of Lawrence, the
sions of particular categories of speech, such as incitement and true threats,
from First Amendment protection. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447–48 (1969) (incitement to imminent lawless action); Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (“true threats”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964) (some defamation); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“fighting words”). The glaring exception is the
obscenity doctrine. See infra notes 280–83 and accompanying text (contending
that acceptance of the harm principle as a barometer of justifiable speech restrictions requires rejection of the Supreme Court’s present basis for permitting obscenity regulations). Concerns about harm also explain Supreme Court
decisions that uphold speech restrictions under a balancing analysis. See, e.g.,
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657–61 (1990) (upholding a state’s restriction on corporate political expenditures under strict scrutiny because the state had a compelling interest in preventing “a danger of
real or apparent corruption”).
234. See supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text. This position compels,
among other things, full protection for political statements that insult or deride specified groups of people. An aspiration of the public rights theory is that
its affirmative First Amendment commitment to robust public debate would
increase real opportunities to answer such hateful expression, which often
targets people and groups for whom a merely formal right to respond with
“more speech” rings hollow. Cf. Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 2, at
1983–85 (describing the public rights theory’s substantive conception of expressive freedom).
235. See supra notes 178–83 and accompanying text (describing present
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Due Process Clause should protect behavior that advances personal autonomy, whether or not the behavior has the descriptive characteristics of “speech.”236 As a practical matter, however, expression is a category of behavior especially likely to
serve and reflect a person’s autonomy and individuality. Moreover, in classic substantive due process terms, the Free Speech
Clause generates penumbras237 or implications238 that make
expression that the First Amendment does not protect an especially logical object of substantive due process protection.
Applying Lawrence to nonpolitical speech claims would
avoid the pitfalls of previous attempts in the public rights tradition to differentiate constitutional protections of political and
nonpolitical speech.239 Unlike Meiklejohn’s procedural due
process salve,240 substantive due process would provide meaningful protection to speech that advances personal autonomy,
reflecting the insight that nonpolitical speech, to the extent it
serves the interest of personal autonomy, deserves a substantially greater constitutional shield than ordinary behavior.
Unlike Sunstein’s two-tiered First Amendment,241 the substan-

substantive due process protections for various nonexpressive activities).
236. By making nonpolitical speech claims turn on the importance of the
speech in question for personal autonomy, this due process approach would
circumvent the speech-action distinction that Robert Bork emphasized to undermine the logic of protecting nonpolitical speech under the First Amendment. See Bork, supra note 25, at 25 (contending that the First Amendment
cannot protect merely self-gratifying speech because no principle permits a
distinction between self-gratifying speech and self-gratifying action). Of
course, shifting nonpolitical speech protection to the Due Process Clause
would also require judges to elaborate and implement legal values, an approach that could hardly have less affinity with Bork’s jurisprudence. See id.
at 28 (arguing that commitment to neutral principles requires leaving disputes about nonpolitical speech to “the enlightenment of society and its elected
representatives”).
237. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (noting that
“specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance”).
238. See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (presenting the
issue as whether the law “infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the enactment violates basic values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’” (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937))).
239. See supra Part I.C.2.
240. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 79–80 (proposing protection for
nonpolitical speech under procedural due process principles).
241. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 263–315 (advancing a proposal to accord nonpolitical speech a lower level of First Amendment protection than political speech would receive).
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tive due process approach would, thanks to Lawrence, enjoy a
doctrinally coherent foundation and embody a principled basis
for extending strong constitutional protection to important instances of nonpolitical expression. Unlike both previous proposals, the substantive due process solution would advance the
positive value of the public rights theory—maximizing protection for political speech—while also effectuating the core insight of the private rights theory: that personal autonomy occupies a central place in our conception of constitutional rights.
Indeed, by concentrating constitutional analysis of nonpolitical speech claims on the personal autonomy values at stake,
this substantive due process approach would far more accurately reflect the principal reason for protecting nonpolitical
speech than present First Amendment doctrine does. Under my
proposal, the Constitution should not protect speech, nonpolitical or political, merely because it is formally “speech,” but
rather because it advances either personal autonomy or political discourse. Focusing on the reason that nonpolitical speech
deserves strong constitutional protection would give the Court
a firm basis for keeping that protection robust. Just as the public rights theory of expressive freedom requires emphasis on
the bottom line of healthy political discourse, application of the
Lawrence doctrine to nonpolitical speech would require emphasis on the bottom line of protecting personal autonomy.
Some may object to extending substantive due process doctrine to encompass nonpolitical speech due to the queasiness
that reflexively greets any proposal to extend substantive due
process. On this view, courts should avoid invoking substantive
due process because the Due Process Clause provides no clear
standards for judicial decision and thus invites judicial activism.242 This argument rests on questionable premises—that
242. The Court articulated this view in Collins v. City of Harker Heights:
As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for
responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and
open-ended. The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in
this field.
503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (citation omitted). Critics might also point out that
the Supreme Court has barred substantive due process claims where a specific
constitutional guarantee is available to challenge the conduct at issue. See
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989) (holding that excessive-force
claims against police officers must be brought under the Fourth Amendment
because it provides an “explicit textual source of constitutional protection”).
Lower courts have invoked Graham to bar substantive due process claims be-
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any constitutional text provides more than a broad outline for a
complex and sophisticated doctrine of rights, that personal
freedom should be a stingy exception to the rule of government
power, and that judicial innovation contradicts the constitutional design. Even if one accepts its premises, however, the argument cannot withstand scrutiny. First, the Lawrence personal autonomy principle clarifies substantive due process
doctrine by providing a conceptually specific value capable of
channeling judicial discretion. Second, present First Amendment doctrine already requires judges to make all manner of
subjective, discretionary decisions in balancing nonpolitical (as
well as political) expressive interests against government regulatory interests.243 Framing nonpolitical speech claims in personal autonomy terms, far from increasing judicial subjectivity,
would anchor free speech jurisprudence by injecting the defining concept of personal autonomy into the balancing of the
speaker’s and the government’s interests.
III. APPLYING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS TO
NONPOLITICAL SPEECH
Shifting constitutional protection for nonpolitical speech
from the First Amendment to the Due Process Clause would
work a substantial change in the law. On the First Amendment
side of the fence, political speech would enjoy stronger protection than it currently does, because no other categories of
speech would complicate the public rights theory’s elevation of
political speech to the highest constitutional priority.244 This
section briefly explores the practical implications of my procause the plaintiffs could have sued under the First Amendment. See Hufford
v. McEnaney, 249 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2001) (barring a firefighter’s claim
that his department fired him for reporting coworkers’ misconduct); cf. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 387–88 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (discussing
the direction from Graham that substantive due process is an inappropriate
basis for claims rooted in an enumerated constitutional right and proceeding
to analyze the plaintiffs’ retaliation claims under a First Amendment framework). Peter Rubin has argued persuasively that only a narrow reading of
Graham, limited to using specific rights guarantees to define the ceilings of
substantive due process claims, comports with established rights jurisprudence. See Rubin, supra note 162, at 865. In any event, my proposal would obviate the Graham problem for nonpolitical speech claims because those claims
would no longer properly arise under the First Amendment.
243. See supra notes 105–11 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity of judicial line drawing under present First Amendment doctrine).
244. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text (describing the benefits for political speech of a judicial shift to the public rights theory).
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posed shift for several controversies involving nonpolitical
speech. Courts would allow government to regulate speech that
is not substantially related to personal autonomy based on
credible showings of potential harm. Speech integral to personal autonomy, however, would receive protection comparable
to, and in some cases stronger than, the protection that the
First Amendment presently provides.
One preliminary problem is determining whose personal
autonomy should matter in the substantive due process speech
balance. The subjects of the personal autonomy claim in Lawrence were direct participants in the legally proscribed behavior. Courts would face greater challenges in determining the locus of due process claims involving speech. First Amendment
theorists frequently have acknowledged the parallel autonomy
interests of speakers and people who receive information.245
Given the plurality of autonomy interests in expression, courts
that apply the Due Process Clause to nonpolitical speech claims
could properly consider the interests of receivers as well as
speakers, according due process protection both to speech that
advances the speaker’s autonomy interest and to speech that
advances the autonomy interests of individual listeners. Notwithstanding the vagaries of standing doctrine,246 the autonomy interests of receivers would provide grounds for institutional speakers to raise free speech claims under the Due
Process Clause in appropriate circumstances.
The discussion that follows requires two additional caveats. First, the Lawrence Court left unclear its precise standard
of review and the relationship of its analysis to doctrinal elements of previous substantive due process cases.247 Considering
245. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 104, at 620–21 (arguing that expressive
freedom serves the value of individual self-realization both by protecting
speech and by protecting the right to receive information).
246. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975) (holding that a
claim that the rights of a third party have been violated is insufficient to establish standing). An approach to constitutional speech protection that emphasized the consequences of protecting or regulating expression would require reevaluation of the Court’s present standing doctrine. See Magarian,
Public Rights, supra note 2, at 1988–89 & n.211.
247. The indeterminate standard of review may simply reflect tiered scrutiny’s limited analytic value. See Tribe, supra note 124, at 1916–17 (arguing
that the Lawrence Court, despite avoiding the ordinary rhetorical formulations of tiered scrutiny, obviously subjected the Texas sodomy prohibition to a
rigorous standard of review). Alternatively, the Lawrence Court may have
viewed the prior substantive due process decisions’ emphasis on identifying
“fundamental rights” as a rhetorical trap inclined to limit the doctrine’s pro-

MAGARIAN_3FMT

2005]

12/22/2005 10:55:40 AM

DUE PROCESS AS PROTECTION FOR SPEECH 301

how free speech controversies would play out under a Lawrence-derived regime therefore involves a necessary element of
conjecture. Second, my proposal would not completely divide
speech claims between First Amendment and substantive due
process cases. Claimants who challenged government interference with their putatively nonpolitical expression would, under
my proposal, retain the opportunity to contend that their burdened expression had sufficient political character to warrant
First Amendment protection. Moreover, the First Amendment
could support claims that restrictions on particular nonpolitical
expression would have chilling effects on political speech. Such
contentions would figure prominently in the adjudication of
many free speech cases, but my discussion presumes scenarios
in which they would not be available in order to focus on how
the Due Process Clause would work distinctly to protect speech.
The discussion briefly examines my proposal’s potential effects on three important categories of speech that frequently
lack political salience: artistic and cultural expression, pornography, and commercial advertising.
A. ARTISTIC AND CULTURAL EXPRESSION
The imperative to protect nonpolitical artistic and cultural
expression against censorship has traditionally formed the
most intuitive basis for criticizing proposals to extend First
Amendment protection only to political speech.248 Advocates of
the private rights theory have made a powerful case for constitutional protection of artistic speech based on its deeply personal importance to the artist.249 Although public rights theorists have finessed the issue by reference to art’s often indirect
political messages, maintaining the singular constitutional
status of political speech requires treating a significant portion
of artistic expression as nonpolitical.250 Under present First
Amendment doctrine, courts emphasize the value of artistic
and cultural expression for personal autonomy and, in terms

tective scope. See Hunter, supra note 170, at 1119 (arguing that the Court’s
conservative wing “has fought to enshrine the category of fundamental rights
as a containment device”).
248. See supra notes 130–40 and accompanying text (describing the consensus in favor of constitutional protection for nonpolitical speech).
249. A very effective recent example is Anne S. Kurzweg, Live Art and the
Audience: Toward a Speaker-Focused Freedom of Expression, 34 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 437, 439–40 (1999).
250. See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.

MAGARIAN_3FMT

302

12/22/2005 10:55:40 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:247

redolent of Lawrence, extend constitutional protection on that
basis. In the words of one recent opinion: “The Constitution exists precisely so that opinions and judgments, including esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature, can be
formed, tested, and expressed. What the Constitution says is
that these judgments are for the individual to make, not for the
Government to decree . . . .”251
Courts, however, have failed to develop a fully coherent
justification for protecting artistic and cultural expression under the First Amendment,252 a deficit that has sometimes led to
unsatisfactory constitutional protection for important speech.
Artistic and cultural expression is especially vulnerable when it
explores themes of sexuality, thereby blurring some officials’
and courts’ perception of the boundary between art and pornography.253 Some decisions have blithely tolerated morally based
regulation of art, particularly in the familiar circumstance
where government patronage underwrites censorship. In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, the Supreme Court
upheld a statutory requirement that federal decisions to fund
art “‘tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency and
respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.’”254 Although the Court tried to downplay the “decency and
respect” requirement as merely advisory,255 it substantively defended the requirement as an appropriate element of the discretion necessarily exercised in a competitive funding process.256 Similarly, in Hopper v. City of Pasco,257 the Ninth Circuit
recognized the prerogative of municipalities to exclude “controversial” art from public forums. In sustaining a First Amendment challenge by artists whose work the city had refused to
251. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000);
see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 248 (2002) (“Art and literature express the vital interest we all have in the formative years we ourselves once knew, when wounds can be so grievous, disappointment so profound, and mistaken choices so tragic, but when moral acts and self-fulfillment
are still in reach.”).
252. See Kurzweg, supra note 249, at 438 (noting the absence of coherent
theory and criticizing the Supreme Court’s medium-specific approach to First
Amendment protection of art).
253. For a discussion of pornography regulation, see infra Part III.B.
254. 524 U.S. 569, 576 (1998) (alteration in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C.
§ 954(d)(1) (2000)).
255. Id. at 581.
256. Id. at 585–86 (justifying the “decency” requirement as an appropriate
component of discretionary allocation of limited funds).
257. 241 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001).
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display, the court concluded only that the city had failed to define and enforce its prohibition on “controversial” art, not that
such a prohibition violated the Constitution.258
More prevalent than manifest judicial allowance for moral
censorship of artistic and cultural expression has been preemptive or reactive self-censorship by sponsoring institutions. The
Smithsonian Institution endured a barrage of such actions during the 1990s. First, objections by western senators to the explanatory texts of an exhibit, The West as America, which
forthrightly dealt with such issues as the ideological nature of
the United States’ western expansion and white settlers’ massacre of Native Americans, led the National Museum of American Art to sanitize the offending texts.259 Just weeks later, the
Smithsonian’s director temporarily removed a work by artist
Sol LeWitt from a tribute to photographic pioneer Eadweard
Muybridge because she deemed the work, a box with apertures
through which viewers observed an approaching nude female,
“degrading to women.”260 In 1996 the National Air and Space
Museum cancelled a long-planned exhibit commemorating the
Enola Gay’s atomic bombings of Japan because of controversy
about the exhibit’s questioning the justifications for the bombings.261 Nongovernmental beneficiaries of government cultural
subsidies face similar pressures. In recent years, fear of controversy within the National Endowment for the Arts “has resulted in a kind of self-censorship among arts groups, officials
of several organizations say, in which applicants try to secondguess what the endowment will approve.”262
Although public patronage looms large in any discussion of
artistic and cultural censorship, governments also use their police powers to suppress provocative or offensive art. Cities shut
down exhibitions due to complaints about offensive content.263
258. See id. at 1078.
259. See Michael Kimmelman, Old West, New Twist at the Smithsonian,
N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1991, § 2, at 1.
260. See Michael Kimmelman, Peering into Peepholes and Finding Politics,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1991, § 2, at 1.
261. See Paul Goldberger, Historical Shows on Trial: Who Judges?, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1996, § 2, at 1.
262. Robin Pogrebin, A New Chief Steps in at a Changed National Endowment for the Arts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2001, at A19.
263. See, e.g., Joe Lewis, Watts Towers Show Nixed, ART AM., Dec. 2001, at
25 (describing Los Angeles officials’ decision to shut down an exhibit that included images of “same-sex dancing partners” and “renderings of police officers and local gang members in what many deemed to be homoerotic poses”).
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The FCC fines performers for expressing controversial or arguably immoral viewpoints over broadcast media.264 States
prosecute artists or museums for fine-art photography that incorporates images of unclothed children.265 Even worse, fear of
government action, as in the context of subsidies, often leads
artistic and cultural institutions to engage in self-censorship.266
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, numerous
institutions suppressed expression that might have appeared
offensive or provocative in light of the attacks.267 As in the controversies about government funding, sexual content has provided the most consistent source of concern. In one recent example, the Denver Civic Theatre pulled down a painting
displayed in conjunction with a performance because the painting depicted two men kissing.268 On a broader scale, the film,
television, music, video game, and comic book industries, under
heavy pressure from the federal government, have all imposed
highly visible rating systems on creators.269 All these episodes
provide cause to fear that our legal system cannot or will not
protect challenging, autonomous artistic or cultural expression
from majoritarian censorship.

264. See, e.g., Jones v. FCC, 02 CIV. 693 (DLC), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16396, at *8–9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2002) (denying on jurisdictional grounds a
poet’s complaint against the FCC for branding one of her works “indecent”).
265. See, e.g., Chuck Philips, A War on Many Fronts, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26,
1990, at F1 (discussing the federal investigation of photographer Jock Sturges
and the indictment of the Cincinnati Contemporary Arts Center and its director).
266. Investigations and harassment by government agencies certainly help
explain private art institutions’ resort to self-censorship as an alternative to
adverse government action. See Axtman, supra note 52 (describing an aggressive federal investigation of a politically charged art exhibit).
267. See Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note 28, at 123–24 (describing
instances of self-censorship by privately owned artistic and cultural institutions following the 2001 terrorist attacks). Much of the art that raised concerns after September 11 has undeniable political content, which means it
would receive First Amendment protection under this Article’s approach to
expressive freedom.
268. See Penny Parker, Kiss-Off of Gallery’s Artwork a Low for ‘Puppetry’
Promoters, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct. 8, 2003, at 7A.
269. See, e.g., Rating Entertainment Ratings: How Well are They Working
for Parents and What Can be Done to Improve Them?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 136–57 (2002) (statement of
Joanne Cantor, Professor, University of Wisconsin-Madison), available at
http://www.joannecantor.com/senatrat_tst.htm (describing present voluntary
entertainment ratings and advocating government action to strengthen and
standardize ratings).
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Unless we accept the unsavory premise that public patronage carries with it some special government prerogative to impose orthodoxy of viewpoint,270 considerations of “decency” and
“controversy” should be out of bounds when the government decides whether and how to sponsor artistic and cultural expression.271 Principles of expressive freedom even more obviously
should preclude government censorship of private artistic and
cultural speech. In both contexts, the Constitution should provide assurances sufficient to deter preemptive self-censorship.
The holes in present First Amendment doctrine’s protection of
nonpolitical artistic and cultural expression derive from courts’
failures to recognize the full constitutional significance of personal autonomy and to reject morally based assaults on
autonomous expression. The autonomy and harm principles articulated in Lawrence make substantive due process a more cogent and effective source of constitutional protection for nonpolitical artistic expression than the First Amendment has been.
Under the reasoning of Lawrence, art’s importance for furthering personal autonomy would elevate censorship of art to the
270. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 599 (1998)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I regard the distinction between
‘abridging’ speech and funding it as a fundamental divide, on this side of
which the First Amendment is inapplicable.”). Among many reasons to reject
this doctrine, a few can be summarized briefly: the government should never
develop a habit of drawing moral distinctions among citizens’ competing ideas;
government funding has sufficient importance to make it a practical necessity
for many artists; and discretionary government rejection of a particular moral
perspective strongly implies government disapproval of that perspective, raising the danger of a chilling effect on other speech. The public rights theory
may also compel a strong rule of government nondiscrimination in subsidizing
expression as a protective condition on the theory’s heightened tolerance for
government regulation to expand expressive freedom. See Sunstein, supra
note 15, at 297–99 (advocating such a rule).
271. A conceivable objection to my contention that the Due Process Clause
would toughen the Court’s protection of art in the particular context of government sponsorship is that the Court, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, held that the Due Process Clause does not place
affirmative obligations on the government. 489 U.S. 189, 195–97 (1989). That
objection lacks force. When the government establishes a public grant program
and then chooses one applicant over another on moral grounds, it is exercising
its discretion within a course of action to which it has already committed. That
commitment distinguishes the arts-funding scenario from the DeShaney majority’s account of the case before it, where the state agency had taken no actions that would have led it to remove a reportedly abused child from his father’s custody. See id. at 192–93 (describing the state’s actions in the case).
Moreover, the Court decided DeShaney during a period when it generally disdained substantive due process doctrine, and Lawrence represents a clear
break from that period.
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height of substantive due process concern.272 Likewise, the
Lawrence Court’s firm rejection of moral grounds for restricting
personal autonomy should place nearly all artistic and cultural
censorship out of bounds.273 Justifying a restriction on artistic
or cultural expression would require a persuasive showing that
the expression caused concrete harm.274 Ideological biases and
“decency” canards would not suffice.
B. PORNOGRAPHY
The Supreme Court purports to accord full First Amendment protection to nonobscene sexually explicit speech.275 The
Court, however, has shown unusual willingness to credit the
government’s grounds for regulating pornography. For example, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., which upheld certain state
restrictions on nude dancing, the Court only grudgingly admitted that such performance was expressive conduct at all276 and
then subordinated the respondents’ expressive interests to an
amorphous “substantial government interest in protecting order and morality.”277 Similarly, the Court has upheld municipal
zoning ordinances that restrict the locations of adult entertainment businesses, minimizing the expressive interests at issue while validating government prerogatives to combat posited but undocumented “secondary effects” of such businesses.278 The Court has even placed a subset of sexually ex-

272. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Lawrence decision’s commitment
to personal autonomy as the basis for substantive due process doctrine).
273. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the Lawrence decision’s rejection of
purely moral grounds for government regulation of activity with value for personal autonomy).
274. One submission that might satisfy this standard would be a demonstrated public health risk from an artistic performance that exposed an audience to contaminated blood. See Kurzweg, supra note 249, at 483.
275. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874–75 (1997) (reiterating the
doctrine that, for adults, nonobscene sexually explicit speech receives constitutional protection).
276. See 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (holding that exotic dancing “is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we
view it as only marginally so”).
277. Id. at 569.
278. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986)
(upholding a Renton, Washington, ordinance that mandated distances between adult movie theatres and residential neighborhoods, churches, parks,
and schools); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63, 73 (1976) (upholding Detroit ordinances that prohibited concentrations of adult-oriented
businesses).
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plicit speech, labeled “obscenity,” entirely outside the First
Amendment’s protection.279 These departures from First
Amendment doctrine resist principled explanation and
threaten to undermine the precepts of expressive freedom.
Moving nonpolitical speech protection from the First
Amendment to the Due Process Clause would sharpen constitutional analysis of pornography regulation. First, pornographic
material’s entitlement to constitutional protection, rather than
turning on the material’s technically expressive character,
would depend largely on the material’s contribution to the personal autonomy of its creators and/or consumers. Pornography
producers could not simply run to court, crying about lost profits. On the other hand, courts could not reflexively dismiss pornographic material’s claims to constitutional protection based
on abstractions about whether the material was “speech”; instead, they would need to examine the material’s value for advancing personal autonomy. Second, courts would need to distinguish precisely between moral and harm-based justifications
for restrictions on pornography, allowing only the latter to vindicate challenged regulations. Regulators would have the opportunity to prove that pornographic material had caused concrete social harms. They could not, however, justify state
pornography regulations simply by asserting the existence of
unspecified harms, let alone by claiming an interest in upholding some notion of public morality.
A shift from First Amendment to substantive due process
protection for pornography probably would produce mixed decisional results. On one hand, constitutional protection for sexually explicit speech would increase dramatically because, in
light of Lawrence, the Supreme Court’s obscenity doctrine is
untenable. The Court’s decision in Miller v. California permitted criminal penalties for “obscene” speech, defined to encompass
works which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be
specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed. A state offense must also be limited to works
which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken
as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.280

279. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
280. Id. (footnote omitted).
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First Amendment doctrine never should have tolerated
such a blatant capitulation to majoritarian biases, but it has.
The Miller Court’s categorical exemption from expressive freedom, however, runs afoul of both aspects of Lawrence that
would animate substantive due process protection for nonpolitical speech. First, the Miller test takes no account of the autonomy value of obscene material. The Miller safe harbor for “serious artistic value” provides some basis for considering
autonomy arguments, but it speaks in very general terms, leaving the autonomy interests of creators and receivers of “obscene” material invisible. Lawrence compels correction of that
defect in Miller, not least because Lawrence itself found autonomy value in what some consider “deviant” sexual behavior281—
exactly the sort of behavior whose mere portrayal Miller allows
states to criminalize. Second, Miller carved out an exception to
First Amendment protection based entirely on states’ putative
interests in moral regulation, defining the “prurient interest”
prong of the obscenity test by reference to the perspective of
“the average person, applying contemporary community standards.”282 The Court made no effort to ground the exception in
concrete harm to third parties. Under substantive due process
as elaborated in Lawrence, the species of purely moral regulation enabled by Miller cannot survive.283
281. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (explaining that
“statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act . . .
touch[ ] upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior”).
282. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. This factor distinguishes the Court’s treatment
of “obscenity” from its analysis of other categories of speech as to which it has
denied or limited First Amendment protection, all of which threaten some degree of harm to third parties. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48
(1969) (incitement to imminent lawless action); Watts v. United States, 394
U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (“true threats”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
268 (1964) (some defamation); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571–72 (1942) (“fighting words”).
283. One federal judge recently held an obscenity prosecution unconstitutional on the theory that Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), established a
fundamental right to possess obscene material, which Lawrence must shield
from morally based regulation. See United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 352
F. Supp. 2d 578, 586–87 (W.D. Pa. 2005). Another district judge has rejected
that argument. See United States v. Gartman, Criminal No. 3:04-CR-170-H,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1501, at *5–6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2005) (denying a motion for reconsideration). Present First Amendment doctrine cannot coherently
support the reasoning of Extreme Associates, because that doctrine has long
and consistently accommodated the morally grounded Miller test despite
Stanley and despite the otherwise prominent prohibition on viewpoint-based
discrimination. Sharpening free speech jurisprudence by applying substantive
due process categorically to nonpolitical speech, as this Article proposes, would
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On the other hand, a substantive due process analysis
would decrease constitutional protection for pornography that
had limited value for the autonomy of artists or consumers, to
the extent regulators could show that the material likely would
harm third parties. These were precisely the contentions advanced on behalf of the MacKinnon-Dworkin antipornography
ordinance struck down in American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut.284 Because institutional profits do not advance personal
autonomy in the sense of Lawrence, the only viable autonomy
claims for pornography would lie with creators—a group that
could include writers, photographers, and directors as well as
models and performers—and consumers. In many cases, creators might face difficulty trying to parlay the creative content of
commercial pornography into viable autonomy claims; moreover, the pornography industry’s exploitation of models and
performers would likely yield, from their standpoint, negative
autonomy values in many cases.285 Pornography consumers potentially could raise salient claims that various pornographic
materials made significant contributions to their sexual autonomy. On the other hand, defenders of the MacKinnon-Dworkin
ordinance in Hudnut maintained that pornography, far from
advancing its consumers’ autonomy, undermined some consumers’ will, increasing their propensities toward misogyny
and sexual violence.286 Thus, the posited behavioral consequences of pornography provided the most powerful justification for the ordinance, which its defenders characterized as
protecting women from rape and other forms of gendered violence and exploitation that shatter their autonomy.
In his Hudnut opinion, Judge Easterbrook offered no suggestion that any person’s autonomy was relevant to evaluating
the ordinance; instead, he stressed the importance of preventing government from interfering with the descriptive category
of “speech.”287 Likewise, Judge Easterbrook turned the harm
repair this long-standing anomaly more effectively than either trying to patch
flawed First Amendment doctrine piecemeal with bits of Lawrence or imagining that Lawrence completely subsumed the First Amendment within the Due
Process Clause.
284. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff ’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (mem.).
285. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 127–33 (1987) (arguing that the pornography industry materially exploits and demeans women who work in it).
286. See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329 (accepting the government’s premise that
“[d]epictions of subordination tend to perpetuate subordination”).
287. See id. at 327–28.
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arguments advanced by the ordinance’s defenders against
them, concluding that any rape or harassment that resulted
from pornography demonstrated pornography’s rhetorical effectiveness.288 These elements of Judge Easterbrook’s decision,
while controversial even on conventional First Amendment
terms, reflect the reality that the ordinance faced a strong First
Amendment challenge simply because it restricted speech. A
substantive due process analysis would proceed from more precise premises: the centrality of autonomy for nonpolitical
speech protection and the requirement of harm to justify regulation. Had the ordinance’s defenders succeeded in undermining autonomy arguments made on behalf of pornography and in
linking pornography to concrete harms, they might well have
defeated a due process challenge.289
C. CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The Supreme Court over the past three decades has developed an increasingly expansive doctrine of First Amendment
protection for corporate speech. The Court generally treats corporations like individuals in First Amendment analysis, extending full protection to most types of corporate speech.290 The
Court has distinguished from fully protected expression the

288. See id. at 329 (asserting that any harm caused by pornography “simply demonstrates the power of pornography as speech”).
289. I offer no view about the likelihood of making either showing, and my
hesitation about predicting the result in the due process scenario reflects a
doctrinal problem that adopting my proposal would require the Court to resolve. Whatever its other constitutional defects, the version of the MacKinnonDworkin ordinance struck down in Hudnut was drafted in a manner that almost certainly rendered it overbroad, though the district court declined to
reach the issue. See Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316,
1339–40 (S.D. Ind. 1984). The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine represents a singular exception to standing doctrine developed in the context of the
present, inclusive First Amendment to protect against government action that
chills expression. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (describing First Amendment overbreadth doctrine as an exception to ordinary
standing rules). The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine should apply in
substantive due process cases where challenged burdens on nonpolitical
speech threaten to cross into the First Amendment’s domain by chilling political expression.
290. See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (striking
down a state restriction on corporate expenditures to influence referendum
proposals); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983)
(distinguishing the lesser First Amendment protection accorded commercial
advertising from the full protection accorded the corporation’s “direct comments on public issues”).
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category of “commercial speech,” a term of art that generally
encompasses commercial advertising.291 Even that subset of
corporate speech, however, gets substantial First Amendment
protection under a species of intermediate heightened scrutiny.292 Although the Court’s protection for “commercial speech”
deviates from its prior deference to government regulation of
advertising,293 several Justices have advocated further diminishing the distinction between commercial speech and fully protected speech.294 In contrast to my proposal’s beneficial implications for artistic and cultural expression295 and ambiguous
implications for pornography,296 shifting protection for nonpolitical speech from the First Amendment to the Due Process
Clause would substantially diminish constitutional protection
for commercial speech and for corporate speech generally.
The Supreme Court generally grants substantive due process protection only to natural persons. That limitation marks
one of the strongest distinctions between the contemporary
substantive due process doctrine that emerged from Griswold
v. Connecticut297 and the discredited doctrine of Lochner v. New
York.298 The Lawrence Court’s crystallization of personal
291. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (defining the special First Amendment category of
“commercial speech” as connoting “speech that does no more than propose a
commercial transaction”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
292. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980) (“If [commercial speech] is neither misleading nor related to
unlawful activity . . . [t]he State must assert a substantial interest to be
achieved by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest. The limitation on expression
must be designed carefully to achieve the State’s goal.”).
293. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that
constitutional speech protection did not extend to commercial advertising).
294. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996)
(plurality opinion) (advocating more searching First Amendment review of
commercial speech regulations that serve “end[s] unrelated to consumer protection”); id. at 523 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (rejecting the Central Hudson balancing test for commercial speech
“at least when, as here, the asserted interest is one that is to be achieved
through keeping would-be recipients of the speech in the dark”) (footnote omitted).
295. See supra Part III.A.
296. See supra Part III.B.
297. 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (striking down a state ban on dispensing
contraceptives as a violation of the fundamental constitutional right to privacy).
298. 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down a state regulation of employees’
hours as a violation of the substantive due process right to contract).

MAGARIAN_3FMT

312

12/22/2005 10:55:40 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:247

autonomy as the basis for substantive due process protection
strengthens the logic of limiting due process protection to individuals, because only individuals can experience personal
autonomy. The limitation of substantive due process protection
to natural persons also distinguishes due process doctrine from
the Supreme Court’s protection of commercial speech under the
First Amendment. That protection reflects the Court’s general
tendency to extend constitutional rights guarantees to corporate “persons” without regard to any underlying interest of discrete individuals.299 Thus, one important consequence of shifting protection for nonpolitical speech from the First
Amendment to the Due Process Clause would be that only
natural persons’ interests could form the basis for nonpolitical
free speech claims. Those interests might be manifest in certain
institutions, such as theater companies or publications’ editorial boards, but a claim could prevail only if suppression of the
speech at issue undermined some natural person’s or persons’
personal autonomy.300 This limitation would render corporate
free speech claims presumptively untenable.
The logic of allowing only natural persons to raise nonpolitical speech claims under the Due Process Clause, and the resulting dearth of constitutional protection for corporate speech,
underscores the Lawrence doctrine’s affinity with previous
autonomy-based theories of expressive freedom. Professor
Baker, perhaps the most sophisticated proponent of an autonomy-based approach to the First Amendment, has argued that
an autonomy focus should preclude protection for corporate
speech.301 Baker conceptualizes expressive freedom as a shield
for “individual freedom and choice,” and he rejects constitutional protection for commercial speech, broadly defined to encompass corporate speech generally, because “commercial
speech does not represent an attempt to create or affect the

299. See Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 394–95
(1886) (extending the equal protection doctrine to corporations).
300. For a related contention that only natural persons’ autonomy interests
should ground constitutional rights claims and insulate behavior from constitutional responsibility through the public-private distinction, see Magarian,
Wartime Debate, supra note 28, at 146–50.
301. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the
Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976) (arguing that First Amendment
theory requires that commercial speech be denied First Amendment protection). But see Redish, supra note 104, at 630–35 (arguing that commercial
speech, because of its important contributions to “self-realization,” should enjoy First Amendment protection).
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world in a way which can be expected to represent anyone’s private or personal wishes.”302 The present doctrine of forceful
First Amendment protection for commercial speech has developed in spite of the Supreme Court’s substantial embrace of the
autonomy-based private rights theory.303 Eliminating that
anomaly would exemplify the increased clarity a substantive
due process approach would bring to nonpolitical speech controversies.
In contrast to Baker’s single-minded emphasis on the
speaker’s autonomy,304 the conception of personal autonomy
this Article has derived from Lawrence also encompasses the
autonomy interests of people who receive information.305 Under
conventional First Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court
has maintained that consumers gain valuable insights, and
thus increase their ability to make autonomous decisions in the
economic marketplace, through exposure to commercial information.306 Stripping away the rhetorical bunting of the First
Amendment, however, would facilitate a fresh critique of receiver-focused arguments for protecting corporate and commercial speech. First, the due process setting would provide space
that the First Amendment precludes for considering countervailing ways in which commercial speech diminishes personal
autonomy by manipulating its audience. Just as pornography
arguably can erode some of its consumers’ inhibitions against
rape and sexual assault,307 commercial advertising arguably
can erode its receivers’ resistance to unfulfilling or even harmful consumption.308 Second, even to the extent commercial
302. Baker, supra note 301, at 3. Baker extends his limitation on First
Amendment protection to exclude corporate speech generally, including corporate political speech, because profit incentives rather than individual value
choices motivate corporate speech. See id. at 14–18.
303. See supra notes 2–13 and accompanying text.
304. See Baker, supra note 301, at 8 (arguing that the First Amendment
“does not give the listener any right other than to have the government not
interfere with a willing speaker’s liberty”).
305. See supra notes 245–46 and accompanying text.
306. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (positing “that [commercial] information is not
in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they
are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the
channels of communication rather than to close them”).
307. See supra notes 280–89 and accompanying text.
308. “The economic enterprise does not passively accept individual values
as given. In order to increase profits, the enterprise attempts to create and
manipulate values. It does this by stimulating particular desires.” Baker, su-
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speech increases consumers’ autonomy, that effect falls short of
the autonomy benefits enjoyed by receivers of art and even
some pornography. Those forms of nonpolitical expression frequently connect with their audiences at deep levels of personal
intimacy. In contrast, the principal argument for protecting
commercial speech—that it assists consumers in making economic decisions—speaks to the less integral idea of economic
autonomy. Corporations’ advertisements surely facilitate consumer purchasing choices, but so do their manufacturing decisions, financial strategies, and distribution practices, all of
which the Court’s disavowal of Lochner long ago made clear the
government may regulate without regard to due process concerns.
In addition, the Due Process Clause likely would protect
commercial speech less forcefully than the First Amendment
does because rationales offered for regulating commercial
speech, as opposed to those offered for regulating art and pornography, tend to appeal much more to practicality than to morality.309 States tend to regulate commercial advertising because of concerns about consumer protection310 or public
health.311 Present First Amendment doctrine gives courts a basis for dismissing even those interests as insufficient to justify
pra note 301, at 19. The Supreme Court has shown inconsistency in evaluating
consumer manipulation arguments against protection of commercial advertising. Compare Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340–44
(1986) (upholding a regulation of gambling advertising based on an interest in
not encouraging gambling), with 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.
484, 504, 516 (1996) (striking down a regulation of liquor advertising despite
the state’s interest in not encouraging alcohol abuse).
309. See supra notes 252–58, 280–83 and accompanying text (discussing
the moral bases of efforts to regulate art and pornography).
310. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 378 (1977) (noting that the
state defended its ban on attorney advertising on the ground that advertising
would lead attorneys to provide clients with services not tailored to clients’
particular needs).
311. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 767 (noting that the
state defended its drug price advertising ban on the ground that such advertising “will place in jeopardy the pharmacist’s expertise and, with it, the customer’s health”). Some commercial speech regulations arguably serve purely
moral purposes. See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs., 478 U.S. at 341 (upholding
a restriction on casino gambling advertising as advancing a substantial government interest in “reduction of demand for casino gambling by the residents
of Puerto Rico”). Assuming a state could not show that such a regulation prevented some cognizable injury within the meaning of the Lawrence harm principle, and assuming the regulated advertisement advanced personal autonomy
in some meaningful sense, a substantive due process approach to protecting
noncommercial speech would foreclose the regulation.
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regulations.312 In contrast, the Due Process Clause after Lawrence compels a pivotal distinction between merely moral reasons for regulating conduct and reasons that rely on a danger of
concrete injury to third parties.313 Particular commercial
speech regulations might fail due process review because they
rested on insufficiently forceful showings of potential for injury,
but courts could not presumptively dismiss the justifications
usually offered for regulating commercial speech.
CONCLUSION
Present First Amendment doctrine does not protect expressive freedom well enough. By treating political expression like
any other kind of speech and balancing it against government
regulatory interests, federal courts have allowed entrenched
power and majoritarian pressure to stifle political debate and
dissent. Conversely, by following the intuition that personal
autonomy justifies expressive freedom but never explicating
what personal autonomy means and what government interests
can properly trump it, courts have created an often incoherent
system of expressive freedom that underprotects artistic and
cultural expression, overprotects corporate and commercial
speech, and manages at turns to overprotect and underprotect
pornography. Theorists who view expressive freedom as a positive public right rooted in the need for informed democratic discourse have long advocated a sensible solution to the political
speech side of the problem: narrow the First Amendment’s protection to political speech but deepen the force of that protection to make suppression of political expression virtually impossible.
The Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence complements that solution by providing a way to protect
nonpolitical speech outside the First Amendment. The Court
has grounded substantive due process protection in a rich and
thorough account of personal autonomy. The Court also has declared that personal autonomy interests must yield to countervailing governmental regulatory interests only where the government regulates to prevent some tangible harm, as distinct

312. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 378–79 (rejecting a consumer protection rationale on grounds of predicted ineffectiveness); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 770 (rejecting a public health justification on grounds of paternalism).
313. See supra notes 213–18 and accompanying text (discussing the Lawrence Court’s embrace of the harm principle).
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from a purely moral affront to the majority’s sensibilities.
These two principles of substantive due process, which resonate
deeply with the rhetoric of prevailing autonomy-based First
Amendment doctrine, allow for a revision of constitutional expressive freedom that would reflect the distinct reasons why
the Constitution protects political and nonpolitical speech.
Nonpolitical expression, which contributes powerfully but not
uniquely to the personal autonomy of both speakers and listeners, should take its place in the pantheon of substantive due
process rights, where the Court’s prohibition against purely
moral regulation provides strong assurance against government censorship of unpopular ideas.
This Article’s proposal for amending free speech doctrine
may raise concerns in two camps. First, some civil libertarians
may view it as a Trojan horse, designed to impose on the First
Amendment a substantive preference for political speech while
maneuvering nonpolitical speech into a weakened position. In
fact, my proposal refines the public rights theory of expressive
freedom by taking personal autonomy seriously and developing
a basis for powerful nonpolitical speech protection that improves on the coherence of present First Amendment doctrine.
Second, judicial minimalists may fear assigning courts the conceptually difficult and important tasks of distinguishing political from nonpolitical speech and, in nonpolitical speech cases,
striking a proper balance between personal autonomy values
and government interests in preventing harms. My proposal,
however, asks judges to draw no more difficult lines and strike
no more challenging balances than any doctrine of expressive
freedom inevitably must and present First Amendment doctrine already does. The proposal improves on present doctrine
by compelling judges in free speech cases to articulate and apply the specific values that anchor our constitutional commitment to protecting both political and nonpolitical speech.

